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FOREWORD 
Research on problems in agricultural policy is im-
portant to provide guidelines for legislating and ad-
ministering agricultural programs. Th€ agricultural 
experiment stations in th€ land-grant colleges and 
universities are in a position to conduct such rcsearch. 
The agricultural experiment stations in the North 
Central Region of the United States joined in a 
regional research project entitled "Measuring and 
Appraising the Impact of Agricultural Price and In-
come Policy Upon Producers, Marketing Agencies, 
a nd Consumers." One of the studies conducted under 
this project is entitled "Effects of Corn Price and 
Income Policies lJpon Producers, Marketing Agencies, 
and Consumers.' l" This bulletin is the fourth in a 
series of regional pUblications from this study. Pre-
vious publieations from the study are listed at the 
right. In addition, r,esearch results have been released 
in mimeograph reports, in articles, in current publi-
cations, in papers presented at meetings and the like. 
Students of agricultural policy, both within and 
outside the colleges and universities and government, 
will find these pUblications of interest and value. 
Past programs are analyzed and alternative solutions 
to problems arc suggested. 
The manuscript for this bulletin was prepared by 
Professor Geoffrey S. Shepherd of Iowa State Uni-
v'ersity who was chairman of a subcommittee in charge 
of the study. Other members of the subcommittee 
were Professor John Dunbar of Purdue University 
and Professor Vincent West of the University of 
Illinois. Members of the NCM-ll Committee repre-
senting their respective state agricultural experiment 
stations at the time the manuseript was approved were 
as follows: 
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Illinois ...................................... Vincent West 
Indiana ._ .................................... _. John Dunbar 
Iowa .. ....... ..... .......... ...... Geoffrey Shepherd 
Kansas ......... _ ..................... _._ .. John Schnittker 
Michigan ... _ .... __ .... __ ........... _ William Cromarty 
:M:innesota ________ . __________________________ Elmer Learn 
Missouri . __ .. _______________________________ . ____ Jerry West 
Nebraska __________________________________ James Hassler 
North Dakota ___________ . ___________ Perry Hemphill 
Ohio ___________________________________ Richard Newberg 
South Dakota ______________________ Phillip VanVlack 
'Wisconsin ______________ . _________ Harlow Halvorson 
-C. Peairs Wilson 
Administrative Adviser 
The following published and unpublished reports (listed 
in chronological order) were prepared under this project: 
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corn placed under loan. Ninth Annual Symposium on 
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SUMMARY 
The original objective of the storage programs in 
1933 was to operate them as price-stabilization pro-
grams to stabilize the prices of farm products against 
year-to-year variations in production. 
In actual fact, however, the programs soon began 
to go further than this. After the first few years, 
the objective changcd from merely stabilizing prices 
to "stabilizing them upward." Loan rates were set 
above the average-weather-crop levels, at certain per-
centages of parity prices. This raised the level of 
prices as well as stabilized them against variations in 
supply. This high level of prices stimulated produc-
tion, reduced consumption and led to the accumulation 
of unsalable surpluses in storage. 
On Feb. 28, 1961, the investment of the CCC in 
price-support programs amounted to $9,193,721,000-
made up of loans outstanding of $2,141,507,000 (in-
cluding $946,376,813 of loans financed by lending 
agencies) and the cost of inventories, $7,052,214,000. 
The "realized cost" of "programs primarily for 
stabilization of farm prices and income" in fiscal 
1960 was $2,094,300,000. The total cost since the 
programs began in 1932 was $19,847,400,000. 
In the case of corn, in fiscal 1958, for example, 
about one-third of the cost went to the grain trade 
and transportation agencies to cover storage and 
handling charges. 
The acreage-control programs of the 1930's had 
little effect on production. The programs after World 
War II had more effect, but since cross-compliance 
was not included, the effect was mostly to shift 
production from one crop to another. 
The acreage restrictions and other features of the 
corn programs did not drive corn acreage and pro-
duction out of the Corn Belt. From 1938 to 1959, 
corn acreage and production became more concen-
trated, not less concentrated, in the original 1938 
commercial corn area. The same thing was true for 
oats. Cattle production just held its own. The pro-
duction of hogs also became more concentrated in the 
Corn Belt. 
The storage' programs had some supporting effect 
on farm prices and incomes. Most of the gain in 
farm income, however, was only temporary. It was 
attained because quantities of feed grains and wheat 
were removed from the market and held in govern-
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ment storage. Some of this grain was disposed of 
abroad under Public Law 480 and other subsidy pro-
grams. The major share, however, seems destined for 
the domestic market. When it is eventually released 
into domestic channels, it will depress prices and 
incomes about as much when it comes back on the 
market as it raised them when it was taken off. 
There will be no net gain so far as those quantities 
are concerned over the period as a whole. Most of 
the gain was borrowed from the future, and when 
the future arrives, it will have to be paid back. 
Over the past 10 years, average farm income per 
person in the United States remained practically 
constant. In 1959, in fact, it declined a little-about 
3 percent-from the 1947-49 average. Even with the 
income from nonfarm sources included, the rise in 
farm income per person was only 10 percent. Most of 
the benefits of the farm programs were capitalized 
into land values rather than increasing farm incomes. 
The reason for this is that the low farm-income 
problem is the result not only of a continuous over-
supply of farm products but also of a continuous 
oversupply of farmers. This oversupply results from 
the high birth rate on farms and the decline in the 
demand for farmers as farming becomes more me-
chanized. Only about one-sixth of the boys now 
growing up on farms will be able to find good jobs 
as farm operators. The ot'her five-sixths will need to 
look for jobs in town. Surpluses of farmers depress 
income per farmer just as surpluses of farm products 
depress the prices of those products. 
Two kinds .of programs are needed, therefore, to 
solve the farm-income problem. One is a program 
to reduce the production of farm products. The 
other is a program to reduce the supply of farmers. 
One way to reduce the supply of farmers is to 
facilitate the movement of excess farmers off farms 
and into better-paying urban jobs. This can be done 
by providing training for farm boys and girls for 
urban jobs as well as for farm jobs; then those who 
need to take jobs in town will be able to fill them. 
These two programs need to be applied on a nation-
al scale. In addition, more intensive programs of a 
similar kind, but adapted to the special conditions in 
a number of depressed agricultural areas, need to be 
developed and applied in those areas. 
Appraisal of the Federal Feed-Grains Programs 
by Geoffrey Shepherd 
In recent years, the agricultural price-support pro-
grams have stabilized feed-grains market supplies and 
prices to a considerable extent; but they have become 
more and more expensive and less and less effective 
in preventing price declines. And until 1961, the 
production-control programs were not able to reduce 
production in line with consumption; surpluses con-
tinued to grow. 
The programs were initiated in 1929 under the 
Federal Farm Board. They failed to achieve their 
objective of stabilizing supplies and prices, primarily 
because of the severe industrial depression, and the 
Farm Board was terminated in 1933. A few months 
later, the Commodity Credit Corporation was set up 
to do the job in a somewhat different fashion, using 
nonl'Ccourse commodity loans to farmers and storage 
operations of its own on the commodities taken over. 
The storage operations of the CCC were conducted 
on a comparatively small scale at first, at relatively 
low levels of loan rates. But in 1938, Congress began 
to prescribe loan rates at certain percentages of parity 
prices, considerably higher than market-price levels. 
This changed the nature of the programs from price 
stabilizing to price-level raising. The loan rates, the 
prices and the quantities of corn placed under loan 
each year are shown in fig. 1 and table 1. The loan 
TABLE 1. Corn: u.s. loan rates, u.s. average farm prices, and differentials between them, support prices and quantity placed under 
support, 1933-56. 
Pla~d under price support 
Announced Average Pur- Under loan 
Year national Average price chase or owned 
beginning average price minus agree- Percentage by CCC at 
October loan rate" Nov.- announced Loans· ments Total of end of 
Mayb loan rate (million (million (million produc- crop year ($/bu.) (%/parlty) ($/bu.) ($/bu.) bu.) bu.) bu.) tion (%) (million bu.) 
1933 ____ 0.45 60 0.45 0.00 268 268 11.2 82 1934. ___ 0.55 68 0.83 0.28 20 20 1.4 1935 ____ 0.45 55 0.55 0.10 31 31 1.3 1936 ____ 0.55 66 1.06 0.51 1937 ____ 0.50 58 0.51 0.01 61d 61d 2.3 45 1938 ____ 0.57 70 0.44 -0.13 230 230 9.0 258 1939 ____ 0.57 69 0.55 -0.02 302 302 11.7 471 1940 ____ 0.61 75 0.58 -0.03 103 103 4.2 403 1941. ___ 0.75 85 0.74 -0.01 111 111 4.2 197 1942_": __ 0.83 85 0.90 0.07 56 56 1.8 8 1943 __ :'_ 0.90 85 1.12 0.22 8 8 0.3 6 1944. ___ 0.98 90 1.07 0.09 21 21 0.7 9 1945 ____ 1.01 90 1.15 0.14 3 3 0.1 
--9 1946 ____ 1.15 90 1.38 0.23 26 26 0.8 1947 ____ 1.37 90 2.20 0.83 1 174e 1 1948 ____ 1.44 90 1.20 -0.24 377 551 15.3 493 1949 ____ 1.40 90 1.18 -0.22 332 55 387 11.9 650 1950 ___ 1.47 90 1.55 0.08 52 2 54 1.8 488 1951. ___ 1.57 90 1.66 0.09 25 1 26 0.9 306 1952. ___ 1.60 90 1.47 -0.13 309 107 417 12.7 580 1953 ____ 1.60 90 1.42 -0.18 369 102 471 14.7 736 1954 ____ 1.62 90 1.38 -0.24 200 59 259 8.5 870 
1955 1.58 87 1.21 -0.37 356 65 421 13.0 1,060 
1956' _~=: 1.50 84 1.21 -0.29 401 76 477 13.8 1,295 
19;;7' 1.40 77 1.02 -0.38 320 49 369 10.8 1,355 1958t_~- 1.36 77 1.05 -0.31 343 38 381 10.0 1,400 1959 ____ 1.12 66 1.00 -0.12 439h 38h 512h 11.7 
19600 __ 1.06 65 
" Applies to commereial area only in years when acreage allotments are in effect. 
b Average price received by farmers in period when most of the corn is placed under price support. In recent years, loans have 
been available from time of harvest through May. 
• Excludes purchase-agreement corn placed under loan in the following year during the period 1948 to date. 
d Includes 14 million bushels of 1937 corn placed under loan for first time in 1938 under short-term loan program. 
e Purchase agreements not available prior to 1947. 
f Loans were made to noncooperators at $1.25 per bushel in 1956, $1.10 in 1957 and $1.06 in 1958. 
o Minimum support; may be increased at beginning of marketing year if higher support Is required. 
h Preliminary. Based on CSS reports. 
Oompiled ,,'0111 reports of Commodity Stabilization Service. Data published cUlTently in: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Mktg. Servo The 
Feed Situation. 
Source 01 table: U. S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural outlook charts, 1956. Nov. 1955. Table 35, p. 68; U. S. Dept. Agr. Grain and feed 
statistics through 1954. U. S. Dept. Agr. Stat. Bul. 159. March 1955. Table 48, p. 46; U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Mktg. Servo The Feed 
Situation, May 1959. p. 23. 
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CORN PRICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
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Fig. 1. Corn price support programs. 
WHEAT PRICES AND LOAN RATES 
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Fig. 2. Wheat prices and loan rates. 
rates and prices for wheat are given In fig. 2 and 
table 2. 
ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STORAGE PROGRAMS 
The original objective, stated in 1933, was to op-
erate the programs as price-stabilizing programs-to 
stabilize the prices of farm products against year-to-
year variations in production. This could have been 
accomplished by setting the loan rates for each crop at 
the level that would havc permitted average-weather 
crops to move into consumption. The exceHS over 
average-weather crops would then havc been removed 
from the market and put into storage to be released 
back to the market in short-crop years. This wonld 
have converted the irregular variations in production 
resulting from irregular variations in weather into a 
more nearly smooth flow of grain into consnmption. 
This would have stabilized prices to a considerable 
extent against variations in supply. 
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TABLE 2. Wheat; Loan rale, price to grawers, supply and distri-
bution factors, quantity under support, delivered to CCC, 
stocks owned by CCC and loans outstanding, 1938-60. 
Supply and distribution 
factors (mil. bu.) 
0; . 
'" Bo;; 
" 
'" 
"I': " ..... ~ .~ of 
" bIJ r:d<l)~ ....... 'C .. .~ " .. .... 
I': ~.~~ ~ .8 .. "'of '" 1':'" "":S ... ~ ., ~ "'''' ., ",> ~.5:a ~af; ", ... 
_ ..... ;.. 
S"" ........ ,0 ~;~ "''''- .. "" "'>- .... .,"" 0"" .,'" ~E "''''' .. 0 .~o= Z8, ~bIJ"" ~.£~ '" '" oS"" A til 'C-'~ bIJ "'" '" E-<o::l 1':., ., ~~.£ ;a X ~of ~ 
'" 
... 'Coo 
'" " 1938 ____ 0.59 0.56 -0.03 1,073 713 110 250 85.7 1939 ____ 0.63 0.69 0.06 991 662 49 280 167.7 1940 ____ 0.64 0.67 0.03 1.094 675 34 385 278.4 1941- ___ 0.98 0.94 -0.04 1,327 667 29 631 366.3 1942-___ 1.14 1.09 -0.05 1,600 949 32 619 408.1 1943-___ 1.23 1.35 0.12 1,463 1,237 -9lC 317 130.2 1944. ___ 1.35 1.41 0.06 1,377 992 106 279 180.4 1945 ____ 1.38 1.49 0.11 1,387 894 393 100 59.7 1946 ____ 1.49 1.90 0.41 1,252 766 402 84 22.0 1941-___ 1.84 2.29 0.45 1,443 757 490 196 31.2 1948 ____ 2.00 1.98 -0.02 1,491 678 506 307 366.0 1949 ____ 1.95 1.88 -0.07 1,406 680 301 425 380.8 1950 ____ 1.99 2.00 0.01 1,444 686 358 400 196.9 1951-___ 2.18 2.11 -0.07 g 1,388 684 448 256 212.9 1952-___ 2.20 2.09 -O.U. 1,562 656 300 606 459.9 
1953. ___ 2.21 2.04 -0.17. 1,779 630 215 934 557.2 
1954. ___ 2.24 2.12 -0.12. 1,917 607 274 1,036 430.7 1955 ____ 2.08 1.99 -0.09. 1,971 598 340 1,033 320.6 1956 ____ 2.00 1.97 -0.03. 2,038 583 546 909 253.5 1957 ____ 2.00 1.93 -0.07. 1,860 583 396 881 256.3 
195L ___ 1.82 1.75 -0.07 g 2,343 625 439 1,279 609.5 1959 ____ 1.81 1.76 -0.05. 2,407 617 507 1,283 317.5 
1960h ___ 1.77 (2,554 ) (620) (497) (1,437) 
CCC stocks and loans outstanding at year-end (June 30) 
Under loan 
Stocks Crop Crops of 
Delivered owned 
by CCCi 
previous earlier 
to CCCI Julyk years Total (mil. bu.) (mil. bu.) (mil. bu.) (mil. bu.) (mil. bu.) 
1938 ____ 15.7 6.6 21.5 28.1 1939 ____ 7.7 1.6 10.3 -7~2 11.9 1940 ____ 173.7 169.2 31.4 207.8 
1941- ___ 269.8 319.7 98.1 1.4 419.2 1942. ___ 184.0 259.8 133.3 4.9 398.0 
1943- ___ 0.3 99.1 15.5 2.5 117.1 1944- ___ 72.9 103.7 20.1 1.9 125.7 1945 ____ 0.2 32.5 32.5 
1946- ___ 0.7 0.7 1947-___ 0.8 0.8 1948-___ 290.9 22i.2 16.3 243.5 
1949 ____ 247.5 327.7 28.5 5.0 361.2 1950 ____ 41.9 196.4 8.9 2.3 207.6 1951-___ 91.3 143.3 11.6 154.9 1952 ____ 397.7 470.0 22.5 492.5 1953 ____ 486.1 774.6 71.4 3.9 849.9 1954-___ 391.6 975.9 11.3 2.8 990.0 1955 ____ 276.7 950.7 27.6 1.3 979.6 
1956 ____ 147.2 823.9 9.5 3.3 836.7 1957-___ 186.9 834.9 14.8 3.4 853.1 1958h ___ 486.1 1,146.6 52.2), 9.9 1,208.7 1959h ____ 161.41 
• United States marketing-year prices are the result of (1) 
weighting state monthly prices by monthly sales to obtain state 
marketing-year averages and (2) weIghting the state marketing-
year averages by total sales for each state. Includes an allow-
ance tor unredeemed loans at average loan values beginning 
1938. 
b Beginning carryover plus production. 
c Total supply minus net exports minus year-end carryover. 
d Includes shipments to United States territories of about 4 
million bushels annually. 
e Includes under purchase agreements, beginning 1948. 
f Exports totaled 45 m\lIion bushels. and imports used to 
supplement domestic animal feed supplies totaled 136 million 
bushels. 
• Growers assumed storage charges which averaged 7 to 10 
cents per bushel, depending on the time it was put under loan. 
h Preliminary. 
I Includes purchase-agreement wheat delivered to CCC. 
J Includes open-market purchases, If any, beginning 1943 and, 
accordingly, may include some new-crop wheat. 
), For example, 52.2 million bushels are 1958-crop wheat under 
loan on June 30, 1959: 9.9 million bushels were under loan from 
earlier crops. Any 1959 crop is not included. 
I Through May 31, 1960. 
Source 0/ table: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Mktg. Servo The Wheat 
Situation. June 1960. p. 4. 
THE PRICE-STABILIZATION PROGRAMS, WERE MISUSED 
AS PRICE-RAISING PROGRAMS 
In actual fact, however, the programs soon began 
to go further than this. After the first few years, 
the objective changed from merely stabilizing prices 
to "stabilizing them upward." Loan rates were set 
above average-weather-crop levels, at certain percent-
ages of parity prices. This raised the level of prices 
as well as stabilizing them against variations in 
supply. This high level of prices stimulated produc-
tion, reduced consumption and led to the accumulation 
of unsalable surpluses in storage. 
During the first 20 years of the programs, this type 
oi operation, as it reachcd a critical stage, was twice 
bailed out by wars-World War II and the Korean 
conflict-which increased the demand so much each 
time that the surpluses quickly vanished. These events 
in effect permitted the programs to stabilize priees to 
some extent against war-induced variations in demand 
as well as in supply. The programs were not planned 
for this purpose; variations in demand are too un-
predictable and too lengthy to be 'handled effectively 
by planned storage operations. But by accident, the 
programs did provide some degree of stabilization 
against variations in demand as well as in supply. 
After 1952, however, as a result oi rapid technologi-
cal advance and several years of good weather, the 
accumulation of surpluses was resumed Oil an un-
precedentedly large scale, against. the will of the 
administrators and with no unexpected increases in 
demand in sight to rescue the programs. The size 
of the stocks in recent years is shown in fig. 3. Most 
of these stocks were owned by the eee. 
In an attempt to stay this accumulation of storage 
stocks, the loan rates were reduc'ed to lower and 
lower perccntages of parity, as the duta in tables 1 
and 2 show. The loan rate for corn, for example, 
dropped from 90 perc,ent of purity, where the rate 
had stood from 1944 to 1954, to 65 percent in 1960. 
But percentages of parity are not appropriate bases 
for price supports. They take into account only 
changes in prices, ignoring changes in quantities of 
product sold and quantities of goods and services 
purchased; thus they ignore the revolutionary tech-
nological improvements in agricultural production 
practices which drastically reduced costs with the 
passing years.1 
In 1958, corn producers were offered a choice 
between (a) the existing program of high supports 
and restricted acreage and (b) lower supports (the 
average of the open-market prices for corn over the 
preceding 3 years, or 65 percent of parity, whichever 
was the higher) and no acreage restrictions. They 
voted for the latter. Corn acreage harvested jumped 
from 73.5 million in 1958 to 84.4 million in 1959, and 
production rose from 3.8 billion bushels to 4.4 billion 
bushels. But the restriction to "not less than 65 per-
cent of parity" and the lag resulting from the in-
clusion of the supporting effects of the program on 
1 For a more complete discussion of parity prices. see: 'Vayne 
Fuller, Glen Purnell, Lonnie Fielder, Marvin Laursen, Ray 
Beneke and Geoffrey Shepherd. An alternative parity formula 
for agriculture. Iowa Agr. and Home Econ. Exp. Sta. Res. BuI. 
476. 1960. 
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Fig. 3. Carryover of malor farm ,ommodlties. 
prices during the 3-year average periods left loan 
rates still above long-run open-market equilibrium 
levels. Surpluses continued to accumulate. 
The stocks were much larger than needed for price 
stabilization purposes. A Senate Document in 1952,2 
after citing "the worst corn production deficits of 
850 to 950 million bushels" that took place in 1934 
and 1936, went on to say: 
Yields of other feed grains tend to fluctuate in 
the same direction as do yields of corn, so that 
the variation in total feed-grain production is 
about 20 to 25 percent larger (in tons or equiv-
alent bushels of corn) than in production of 
corn alone. To cover this additional source of 
variation (and that in corn yields as well) 
would have required a total carryover of 900 
million to 1 billion bushels of corn plus the 
equivalent of another 100 million bushels in the 
form of reserves of other grains in excess of 
working stocks. 
But this estimate does not pay much attention to 
the costs of storing the stocks. Karl Fox, then with 
the USDA, concluded that, when the costs of storage 
are taken into account, a typical com carryover dur-
ing a period of normal yields should be 600 to 700 
million bushels: He added that the eee should not 
take action to reduce the corn carryover below about 
500 million bushels, or feel alarmed if corn stocks rose 
to 800 million bushels as a result of better-than-
average weather. Shepherd and Richards arrived at 
a round figure of 1 billion bushels of corn equivalent 
for total feed grains.4 This includes an allowance 
of 100 million bushels for feed grains other than. corn. 
This figure, therefore, is about 100 million bushels 
higher than Fox's upper limit of corn carryover of 
800 million bushels. 
~Iore recently, R. L. Gustafson, in his Rule 1 based 
on maximizing net gain, recommends only about 200 
, Reserve levels for storable farm products. 82nd Cong., 2nd 
sess. Sen. Doc. 130. 1952. 
3 Long range farm program. House Committee Print, 1954, 
p. 39. 
4 Geoffrey Shepherd and Allen RichardS. Effects of the USDA 
corn storage program on corn carryover stocks and corn utiliZa-
tion. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. BuI. 446. (North Central 
Regional PUblication No. 77.) 1957. p. 985. 
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TABLE 3. Realized Cost of Agricultural and Related Pro grams, by Function Dr Purpose, Fiscal Years 1932-1960· 
(This statement reflects the realize<;l cost of agricul~ural and related. programs. It differs from table~ on realized. cost prepared !n 
years prior to 1958 In oruer to give effect to adJustments reflectmg recommendatIOns of Congressional Committees, changes III 
legislation and further review of the nature and purposes of the various programs. The costs shown are determined as follows: 
(1) For activities financed from appropriated funds, the expenditures less receipts arising from the activities so financed; (2) 
for noncorporate loan funds, the losses on loans and the net interest cost or income; (3) for Commodity Credit Corporation and 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Prog"a1HS Primarily for Stabilizatim~ of 
FW'1!b P"ioes and income: 
CCC nonrecourse loan, purchase, and payment programsb ___ _ 
CCC supply, commodity export, and other activities _________ _ 
CCC interest, administrative and other general costs _________ _ National 'Wool Act Program _______________________________ _ 
International Wheat Agreement" ___________________________ _ 
Donations of commodities to other nations - excess of inventory cost over market valued ________________________ _ 
Commodities sold for foreign currencies 
under Title I, P.L. 480" _________________________________ _ 
Removal of surplus agricultural commodities!. ______________ _ Sugar Act ________________________________________________ _ 
Soil Bank - acreage reserve program ______________________ _ 
Acreage allotment payments under the Agricultural Conservation Program _______________________ _ 
Other, Including Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 
parity payments, and other adjustment and surplus 
removal programs._ _ _ _____ _ 
TotaL ______ _ 
* Excess of credits-deduct. 
This table on realized costs of agricultural ami related pro-
grams reflects, essentially, the cost to the taxpayer, over a 
period of time, of all the programs of the Department of Agri-
culture. The present table is a revision which adds one more 
year to the Similar table prepared last year, with adjustments 
to reflect recommendations of the House Committee on Agri-
culture, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, changes 
in legislation, and further review of the nature and purposes of 
the various programs. 
"Realized cost" means the net cost actually incurred to date. 
H was adopted as the basis for the statement since (1) it is a 
realistic measure of the actual financial results of program 
operations within a specified time, and (2) it is a common 
denominator which can be applied to all programs regardless 
of how they are financed. For example, the advancing of a loan 
to a borrower under one of the Department's lending programs is 
not conSidered a cost. It is regarded as an investment which will 
be repaid. However, the interest paid by the Government on 
funds provided for lending purposes Is considered a realized 
cost of the year in which it accrues. Similarly, Interest collected 
from the borrower Is included as Income, or a reduction of cost. 
The principal amount of a loan becomes a cost only in the event 
the borrower defaults and the loan Is written off by the Depart-
ment. This example is illustrative of how the realized cost ap-
proach comprises clements of cost as distinguished from cash 
outlays, and how it also takes into account Income and program 
million bushels corn cquivalent working stocks when 
total feed supplies are about average.:; The recom-
mended quantity when total supplies are large varies 
with the size of the total supplies. 
The stocks of corn, thercfore, were nearly twice as 
large llS needed for stabilization purposes. The 
corresponding stocks of wheat wcre more than twice 
as large ~s need~d.G 
COST OF THE STORAGE PROGRAMS 
The costs of t.he CCC storage programs rose to 
high levels. On Fcb. 28, 1961, the CCC said in a news 
release that. "investment of the CCC in price-support 
programs amounted to $9,193,721,000-made up of 
loans outstanding of $2,141,507,000 (including $946,-
376,813 of: loans financed by lending agencies), and 
the cost value of inventories, $7,01)2,214,000." The 
composition of this investment by commodities Oil Jan. 
1, 1960, is shown in fig. 4. 
r. R. L. Gustafson. Carryover levels for grains. U. S. Dept. 
A gr. Tech. Bul. 1178. p. 19. See also: R. L. Gustafson. Impli-
c'Ltions of recent research on optimal storage rules. Jour. Farm 
Econ. 40 :290-300. May 1958. The rules are given on pp. 294-295. 
G Sen. Doc. 130. all. cit. 
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Total 
4,937.6 
507.2 
2,028.9 
233.4 
1,096.2 
244.0 
2,417.0 
2,510.4 
437.4" 
1,662.3 
2,354.8 
2,293.0 
19,847.4 
1932-39 1940 
19.0 
13.2 
314.2 
33.7 
881.7 
1,034.0 
2,228.4 
7.4 
8.7 
143.9 
25.2* 
880.2 
223.8 
738.8 
1941 
34.0 
2~2 
226.1 
30.0' 
326.7 
195.7 
754.7 
1942 
69.1· 
0.1· 
9.6* 
196.3 
33.0' 
332.5 
202.1 
619.1 
1943 
49.9· 
2.0 
12.1 
112~0 
0.8· 
218.1 
203.7 
497.2 
1944 
5.9· 
12.4· 
10.4 
63.4 
22.5* 
193.1 
156.9 
383.0 
1945 
29.4 
5.8 
26.1 
24.9 
33.1* 
6.1* 
47.0 
credits. The realized cost basis can be applied to all programs 
since, regardless of how funds are made available for carrying 
out a program, there is In each instance a measurable net 
cost of operations to date. Many of the Department's programs 
are financed directly from appropriations, some activities are 
carried out by Corporations using their corporate funds, and 
others are operated from revolving funds. Funds available, 
therefore, is not a practicable common denominator for all pro-
grams; it likewise does not take into account income or off-
setting receipts arising from operations. Realized cost does 
not Include any element of anticipated gains or losses and, 
accordingly, is not synonymous with "accrued cost" or "accrued 
income and expense." 
The statement is designed to present, in an objective and 
factual way, the realized costs of agricultural programs tor the 
information of those Interested in agriculture or in govern-
mental operations generally. It was prepared by the Depart-
ment to meet the need for a single table which would cover in 
a consistent fashion all of the agricultural programs. 
b Includes the loss on CCC donations representing the excess 
of inventory cost oyer market value of commodities donated. 
The market value of such donations is Included below in the 
categories designated "School Lunch and Donations" and "Other. 
including Wartime, Defense, and Special Needs." (Ed. note: 
These footnotes were taken verbatim from USDA data. The 
categories referred to here, however, are in a section of the 
table not reproduced In this bulletin.) 
The "realized cost" of "programs primarily for 
stabilization of farm prices and income" in fiscal 
PRICE SUPPORT HOLDINGS 
Owned, Under Loan and Purchase Agreements 
$ BIL. 
2 
o 
19.48 1950 1952 195.4 1956 1958 1960 
U.!. DEP.lRTMEhiT [IF AGlIlCULtURE NEG. ,,11 •• 0111 AelilCULTURAL JrU.IU(!1IN(; URYICI! 
Fig. 4. Price support holdings of farm commodities owned, under 
loan and purchase agreements. 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation corporate funds, the net gains or losses from operations and the interest cost to Treasury on 
Govel'I}ment-sll:bscribed capital; and (4) for corporations of the Farm Credit System, the interest cost to Treasury on Government-
subscribed capital and payments made by Treasury on account of reductions in interest rates on mortgages less dividends and 
franchise taX)es paid to Treasury. Interest cost to Treasury on noncorporate loan funds and on Government-subscribed capital of 
corporations has been computed on the basis of the average rate incurred by Treasury on the public debt in each of these years.) 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
30.1* 71.9 125.4 254.7 230.6 235.4 58.6 58.6 
35.9' 242.7' 38.4' 4.7' 2.7' 1.6 1.3 1.6' 
33.2 13.9 6.5' 15.9 48.1 42.0 34.6 55.3 
i5~6 18-0~4 171.3 13-0~8 
19~2 78.4 51.2 75.6 96.6 46~0 i7~5 ii3 
5.4' 7.8' 13.1' 23.9" 14.7" 14.9' 21.8' 20.5" 
22.5 
1.5* 2.2" 10.8 24.9 18.8 7.1 7.6 
2.0 88.5' 118.6 328.4 458.4 509.3 288.6 312.5 
• The expenditures under this program are for payment of 
the difference between the price specified in the International 
Wheat Agreement and the domestic price of wheat. 
d The market value of such donations is inCluded below in the 
category designated "School Lunch and Donations." (Ed note: 
These footnotes were taken verbatim from the USDA data. The 
category referred to here, however, Is in a section of the table 
not reproduced in this bulletin.) 
e Represents the net realized cost of commodities shipped to 
foreign countries in accordance with the provisions of the Agri-
cultural Trade Development and ASSistance Act (P.L. 480, 83rd 
Congress, as amended). The total cost for fiscal year 1959 was 
$1,113,254.336, representing (1) the excess of the investment 
in CCC-owned commodities shipped over the export sales value, 
$150.862,853; (2) the cost of financing exportation, $938,208,-
823 (primarily cost of commodities shipped from private stocks 
and ocean transportation); and (3) interest of $24,182,660. 
The total cost Is reduced by a credit of $795,148,196 for foreign 
currencies collected under this program in fiscal 1959, resulting 
in a new realized cost of $318,106,140. The credit consists of 
the U.S. dollar proce-eds ($83,326,274) from sales of foreign 
currencies at rates of exchange current at a time of sales of 
such currencies, and the U.S. dollar equivalent of (1) foreign 
currencies used for the purposes authorized by Section 104 of 
the Act ($465,332,722), valued at the rate specified in the 
agreement for loan and grant disbursements and for other dis-
bursements, at the rate at which the transfer from Treasury waS 
1959 was $2,027,900,000: The total cost since the 
programs began in 1932 was $19,847,400,000. The 
breakdowns for 1960 and earlier years are given in 
table 3. 
Only a part of these expenditures went directly to 
farmers. The rest went to other groups, such as 
storage fees to storage agencies, and indirectly to 
construction companies for the building of additional 
storage space. These other agencies received a sub-
stantial part of the income transferred from tax-
payers. In fiscal ]958, for example, the "realized 
cost" of the corn program was $271 million. Of this 
amount, $110 million-about one·third-went to the 
grain trade and transportation agencies to covel' 
storage and handling charges. Nonc of this went 
to farmers. Thc program thus has been a "grain-
trade program" as well as a farm program. It has 
aided segments of the grain trade as well as farmers. 
This i~ one of the reasons why the grain trade, 
The "realized cost" is large In recent years partly because It 
includes t"e cost of acquiring the lurge inventory built up in 
those years. If crops were "CIT small in 1960 and later years 
Rnd prices l'ose enough to pull substantial quantities out of 
Rtoralte rot· sale on the mal'ket, the revenue frolll those sales 
woul,l offset " lal'l.,-e pa rt of the total costs in those years, and 
"realized cost" would he relatively small. 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
372.1 422.6 566.6 874.8 690.0 528.2 513.3 
24.7 49.5 70.0 149.1 97.1 132.8 311.8 
102.7 81.7 195.2 311.7 364.9 195.0 478.1 
0.2 2.0 61.3 57.2 20.0 92.7 
59.0 99.7 92.3 90.1 82.4 48.3 66.3 
24.1 37.8 39.5 39.0 43.1 30.7 29.8 
1i1.6 129.5 304.9 497.2 666.2 318.1 501.1 58.9 179.1 171.1 125.5 140.9 89.7 
11.9" 13.0' 22.3' 23.4" 21.3· 24.1" 21.0· 
3.6 514.7 535.3 608.7 
36.7 35.1 30.3 28.7 24.8 29.3 32.5 
785.0 902.0 1.461.2 2.714.3 2.665.2 2,027.9 2,094.3 
made; and (2) foreign currency balances on hand June 30, 1959 
($1,327,589,930), valued at the Treasury selling rate at that date, 
less foreign currency balances on hand at June 30, 1958 ($1,081,-
100,730), valued at the Treasury selling rate as of June 30,1958. 
f Excludes cash payments to schools for part of their school 
lunch program -expenditures during fiscal years 1943 to 1949, in-
clusive. 
g Includes (1) Acreage allotments and marketinll' quotas pro-
gram; (2) Parity payments; (3) Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1933 and related Acts; (4) Agricultural Marketing Act Re-
volving Fund, and payments to stabilization corporations for 
losses incurred; and (5) Miscellaneous, including four miscel-
laneous programs as follows: (a) net operating results of the 
l~cderal Surplus Commodities Corporation which operated from 
1935 to 1942 for the purpose of purchasing, processing, storing. 
handling, transporting. and disposing of surplus agricultural 
commodities and products for relief; (b) retirement of cotton 
pool participation trust certificates; (c) remo\'al of surplus 
cattle and dairy products; and (d) transfer of hay anll pasture 
seeds to Federal land administering agencies. The amount of 
$1.034.0 million shown for the period 1932 to 1989 represents 
$378.6 million for costs of programs conducted by the Federal 
Farm Board in the years 1932 to 1934, and $655.4 million for 
costs of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and related 
Acts. 
Som'ce: Taken verbatim from USDA data. 
originally bitterly opposed to "government interfer' 
ence" in the grain business, became reconciled to it 
as the years went by. A survey, taken in 1957, of 
Iowa county grain dealers' attitudes toward the 
federal grain-storage program revealed that most of 
the dealers expressed satisfaction with the program.s 
THE PROGRAMS TEMPORARILY RETARDED BUT DID NOT 
PREVENT A DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES 
Figure 5 indicates that, in spite of the large scale 
and high cost of the storage programs, the programs 
were not able to keep prices received by farmers from 
declining both in absolute terms and relative to prices 
paid by farmers. The parity ratio declined after the 
Korean conflict in 195], until in :;\rurch ]961 it stood 
at only 80. 
There is some statistical evidence that the storage 
programs had a temporary supporting effect on agri-
cultural prices Hnd incomrs. These pric-cs and in('omes 
• Geoffrey S. Shepherd, Allen B. RichardS anll John T. "\Vilkln. 
Some effects of fedcI'al grain storage programs on grain storage 
capacity, grain stocks and country elevator operations. Ind. Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 697. (North Centml Hegional Publication 
No. 114.) June 1960. 
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Fig. 5. Farmers' prices decline from 1958. 
did not rise, but the evidence indicates that without 
the programs, prices and incomes would have fallen 
farther than they did. 
Two different studies, using different analytical 
techniques,O reached the same conclusion - that dur-
ing the period from 1952 to the present, the programs 
raised the prices of feed grains and wheat, and prob-
ably cotton, to some extent above the levels which 
they otherwise would have rcached. This effect OIl 
prices is shown in table 4. Column 3 shows the 
estimates of pric'es if all the feed grains that went into 
storage after 1952 had instead been fed to livestock. 
Column 4 shows the estimates if the increase in the 
stocks of wheat had been fed, too. 
This raising of prices increased the incomes of feed-
grains and wheat producers as a group, since the 
increase in prices was greater in perccntage terms 
than the reduction in production that resulted from 
acreage restrictions. The effects of the acrcage re-
• Geoffrey Shepherd and Allen Richards. Effects of the federal 
programs for corn and other grains on corn prices, feed grains 
production and livestock production. Iowa Agr. and Home Econ. 
Exp. Sta. Res. Bu!. 459. Aug'. 1958; Geoffrey Shepherd, Amold 
Paulsen. Francis Kutish. Don Kaldor, Richard Heifner and 
Gene Futrell. Production. price and Income estimates and pro-jections for the feed-livestock economy under specified control 
and market-clearing conditions. Iowa Agr. and Home Econ. 
Exp. Sta. Spec. Rpt. 27. Aug. 1960. 
TABLE 4. United States average farm price of basic livestock 
strictions on production before 1958 may have been 
offset, or more than offset, by the effects of the 
higher and more certain prices. 
The raising of the prices of feed grains and wheat 
also increased the prices and gross income of livestock 
and livestock producers, since the high prices of feed 
grains and wheat restricted livestock production. This 
restriction of livestock production increased income, 
because the demand for most livestock and livestock 
products is inelastic. The effect of the programs on 
total United States net farm income for 1952-59 is 
indicated by the estimate that the income would have 
been 34 percent lower than it actually was if the pro-
grams had not been in effect. 
Most of the gain in farm income resulting from the 
corn and other feed-grains programs, however, was 
only temporary. It was attained because quantities 
of feed grains and wheat were removed from the 
market and held in government storage. Some of this 
grain was disposed of abroad under Public Law 480 
and other subsidy programs. The major share, how-
ever, seems destined for the domestic market. When 
it is eventually released into domestic channels, it 
will depress prices and incomes about as much when 
it comes back on the market as it raised them 'When it 
was taken off the market. There will be no net gain 
so far as those quantities are concerned over the 
period as a whole. Most of the gain was borrowed 
from the future and will have to be paid back when 
the future arrives. 
REASONS WHY PRICES DECLINED 
The basic reason why the storage programs were 
unable to keep agricultural prices from declining was 
that the technological agricultural revolution during 
and after World War II caused production to increase 
faster than the demand increased. Figure 6 shows 
that agricultural production increased 27 percent from 
1950 to 19£>0, while population increased only 19 per-
cent. 
"During the past 5 years, the an11ual net additions 
to stocks of major crops have amounted to the equiva-
U. S. POPULATION AND FARM OUTPUT 
% OF1950 
products, actual, and estimated with higher lavels of 130 f--------f--
feed consumption, 1952-58. 
Product 
]~stimated average 
prices with 
increased 
grain consumption 
Actual average -------
Beef cattle, average price 
received by farmers ($/cwt.) __ 
Hogs. averag'e price received 
by farmers ($/cwt.) _______ _ 
Sheep, average price received 
by farmers ($!cwt.) ________ _ 
Farm chickens (c/lb.) _______ _ 
Eggs per dozen (c!doz.) _____ _ 
Milk eligible for fluid 
market ($/cwt.) ____________ _ 
Corn ($/bu.) at a 1:13 ratio 
to hog prices . _ ___ _ __ 
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prices Of 6.3 Of 10.3 
18.03 
18.23 
6.78 
17.57 
39.7 
4.73 
1.32 
percent percent 
17.15 
14.77 
6.55 
15.22 
34.58 
4.64 
1.13 
16.59 
12.58 
6.40 
13.72 
31.24 
4.56 
0.97 
1955 1960 1965 
.6 U.sI'D ON C£H.sUI ,JERI!!!I J1' I" .. OI.c:r.OIll. 
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Fig. 6. UnIted States population and farm output. 
lent of a little more than 5 percent of the harvested 
cropland. "10 During the period 1955-57, "about 7 
percent of total farm marketings were diverted from 
the operation of the normal marketing system by 
price suport and surplus disposal operations."l1 
The increase in production was the basic cause of 
the decline in prices after 1951. It is obvious that a 
storage program alone could not solve this kind of 
problem. It could have only a temporary effect at 
best. 
If there had been no price-support programs, the 
basic oversupply situation would have shown up as 
a low-price problem. Instead, the price-support pro-
grams caused it to show up chiefly as a surplus-stocks 
problem, partly by encouraging further increases in 
production through the removal of price uncertainty 
and guarantee of prices above long-run open market 
levels, and partly by reducing consumption by live-
stock. 
PRODUCTION CONTROLS INEFFECTIVE 
The production-control programs were unable to 
check this pressure for production to expand. 
The reasons for this are clear: The production 
controls were focused on only one of the thrce factors 
of production - land. No attempt 'Was made to 
restrict labor or capital. There is enough substitut-
ability among the factors of production in agriculture 
so that reductions in one were more or less completely 
offset by increases in the others. 
Several different analysts came to the same con-
clusion - that except for tobacco, the acreage-control 
programs of the ]930's had very little effect On 
productionP The programs after World War II had 
more effect, but since cross-compliance was not in-
cluded, the effect was mostly a shift of production 
from one crop to another. 
The ] 954 and 1955 corn-acreage programs, for ex-
ample, apparently had very little effect on total 
acreage in crops. They also had very little effect on 
corn acreage; but they did affect total feed-grain 
production by increasing the production of other 
feed crops. 
Table 5 shows that the total United States acreage 
of corn decreased only 1 percent from 1953 to 1955. 
The small size of the decrease in corn acreage was 
chiefly due to the lack of compliance by many corn 
farmers. Only 42 percent of the Iowa farmers in-
terviewed in a USDA study complied with corn allot-
ments.13 Most of the corn farmers interviewed who 
10 Sherman Johnson and Kenneth Bachman. Recent changes 
In resource use and in farm incomes. In, Center for Agr. and 
Elcon. Adjustment. Problems and policies of American agricul-
ture. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 1959. p. 11. 
11 86th Cong., 2nd sess. Sen. Doc. 77. 1960, P 20. 
12 T. VV Schultz and O. H. Brownlee. Effects of crop acreage 
control fe'atures of AAA on feed production in 11 midwest states. 
Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. But. 298. April 1942. See also: T. VV. 
Schultz. Ao;riculture in an unstable economy. McGraw-Hill. New 
York. 1945. p. 172; and G. Shepherd. Agricultural price policy. 
Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 1947. pP. 61-64. 
TABLE 5. Changes in production, harvested acreage and yields 
for various crops in the United States between 1953 and 
1955. 
Crop 
VVheat _____________ _ 
Cotton _____________ _ Corn ______________ _ 
Rice (1954-55) _____ _ Oats _______________ _ 
Barley _____________ _ 
Grain sorghum _____ _ 
Soybeans for beans __ Flaxseed ___________ _ Rye _______________ _ 
All tame hay _______ _ 
Harvested 
acreage (percent) 
-30 
-31 
-1 
-28 
+4 
+66 
+105 126 10 
49 
+3 
Total 
production (percent) 
-20 
-11 
no change 
-17 
+30 
+61 
+113 
i 38 11 61 
+7 
Yield 
per acre (percent) 
+15 
+28 
+-1;.~ 
+25 
-3 
Ii 
Source: U. S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Res. Servo Effects of acreage 
allotment programs. U.S. Dept. Agr. Prod. Res. Rpt. 3. June 
1956. p. 6. 
did not comply with corn allotments intended to feed 
their corn and, therefore, were 110t interested in com-
plying for eligibility in the priee-support program. 
Reductions in corn aeres made by those who complied 
with the program were just about offset by increases 
in corn acres made by farmers who did not comply. 
Table 5 also shows that the corn program had little 
or no effect on corn production. But the programs 
for wheat and cotton had substantial effects on total 
feed-grains production. 
Compliance with the wheat and cotton programs 
was high_ All wheat farmers interviewed by the 
USDA in North Dakota and Washington complied 
with the allotments. All but 4 percent of the wheat 
farmers interviewed in Kansas and 14 percent inter-
viewed in :Montana complied. 1\1ost of the acres 
diverted from wheat, cotton and corn went into feed-
grain production. Iowa corn farmers who complied 
with corn allotments grew more soybeans and oats. 
Wheat acres were reduced by 30 percent (see table 5). 
These acres were mainly diverted to grain sorghum 
in Kansas and to barley in other major wheat-produc-
ing regions. The acres which were taken out of 
cotton production were shifted mainly to the produc-
tion of soybeans, corn, grain sorghum and barley. 
The diversions of acres from allotment crops to feed 
grains other t'han corn resulted in a 10-percent in-
crease in the total production of feed grains. This 
increase in feed-grains production was not necessarily 
a net addition to the total quantity of grain fed 
because some of the wheat would have been fed any-
way. But the increase had some depressing effeet 011 
feed-grain prices_ 
TInts, the wheat and cotton producers transferred 
a substantial part of their surplus problem to the 
producers of the nonbasie crops, chiefly the feed 
grains other than corn, for which price supports were 
provided without restrictions on production. 
"The expansion in production of feed grains and 
the lower prices of these grains tended to encourage 
an expansion in production of grain-consuming live-
stock. However, much of the 6-percent increase in 
this type of livestock that occurred between 1953 and 
1955 probably would have occurred without the allot-
ment programs.' '14 13 U.S. Dept. Agr., Agr. Res. Servo Effects of acreage allot-
ment programs. U.S. Dept. Agr. Prod. Res. Rpt. 3. June 1956. 
See also: North Central Farm Management Research Commit-
tee. Farmers reaction to acreage allotments. Ky. Agr. Exp. Sta. 
Dec. 1955. 14 U.S. Dept. Agr. Prod. Res. Rpt. 3. op. cit.. p. 6. 
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COST OF THE ACREAGE-CONTROL PROGRAMS 
The cost of the acreage-control program is included 
as one of the items in table 3_ It was $608,700,000 
in 1959_ 
The data for earlier years and the total for all 
years are also given in table 3_ These data show the 
shift from the category "acreage allotments" after 
1947 to the "soil bank" in later years_ 
THE PROGRAMS TEMPORARILY SUPPORTED PER-CAPITA 
NET FARM INCOMES BUT DID NOT INCREASE THEM 
Not only were the programs unable to keep agri-
cultural prices from declining; more important, they 
were unable to increase net per-capita farm income. 
Table 6 and fig_ 7 show that average farm income 
per person has remained practically constant over the 
past 10 years in the United States. In 1959, in fact, 
it declined a little - about 3 percent - from the 
1947-49 average. Even with the incomes from non-
farm sources included, the rise in farm income per 
person was only 10 percent. 
These averag,e per-capita income data are affected 
by the fact that they are based on "farms" as defined 
by the census. Thirty percent of these "farms" 
produce only 2 percent of the total farm products 
TABLE 6. Per-capita income of farm and nonfarm population, 
United States, 1950-59. 
Average net income per capita of 
Nonfarm 
Year Farm population population 
Non-
Agricultural agricultural All All 
sources sources sources sources 
1950 ____ $626 $212 $838 $1,585 1951. ___ 751 232 983 1,763 
1952-___ 711 251 962 1,849 1953 ____ 666 265 931 1,902 1954-___ 654 262 916 1,852 
1955 ____ 602 281 883 1,979 
1956 ____ 597 300 897 2,074 1957 ____ 627 306 933 2,121 1958 ____ 740 299 1,039 2,082 
1959 644 321 965 2,216 
Source: U.S. Dept. Agr., Agr. 1\lktg. Servo The Farm Income 
Situation. July 1960, p. 38. 
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Fig. 7. Farm and nonfarm Income per person. 
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sold; they really are not farms at all, but only country 
residences for urban people. But the situation is 
much the same if these farms are excluded and only 
the commercial farms are included - those farms 
with gross sales of $2,500 or more and which produced 
91 percent of the total farm products marketed in 
1959. The average net income from farming of 
these commercial farms was $5,200 in 1949-51, but 
only $4,200 in 1959. If income from nonfarm sources 
is included, the figures are about $6,000 in 1949-51 
(when nonfarm family income was $5,300) and $5,800 
in 1959 (when nonfarm income had risen to about 
$7,600). 
These farm-income figures include the return on the 
farmers' own capital invested in their machinery, 
buildings and land. Data compiled by the Agri-
cultural Research Service, USDA, for commercial 
owner-operated farms in the 32 chief types-of-farming 
areas in the United States, show that in all but two 
of the 32 types, a substantial decline took place from 
1947-49 to 1959 in the net return to operator and 
family labor and management after deduction of a 
charge for the owner-operator's capital. The same 
sort of thing is shown in a study by Ruttan and 
Stout of Purdue University; they estimate that the 
share of gross farm income going to labor and manage-
ment on farms declined from about 44 percent in 
1947-49 to about 24 percent in 1957,u; 
Table 7 and fig. 8, however, show that ill the same 
period, the value of farmland and buildings per acre, 
which is based chiefly on the return to land, rose 68 
percent. 
Why did net farm income per person remain practi-
cally constant while the value of farmland per acre 
rose 68 percent ~ If nonfarm per-capita incomes also 
had remained about constant, it would indicate that 
some general factor had held down all incomes. But 
table 6 and fig. '; show that per-capita nonfarm in-
come rose 47 percent. 
Why Did Land Values Rise? 
Land values are determined by many factors - the 
desire for protection against inflation, for prestige, 
for security, etc. - but the chief factor usually is the 
return that the buyer expects to get from the land. 
These returns have been affected by the application 
of new technology and the operation of the price-
support, acreage-allotment and Soil Bank programs. 
1. The effects of the application of new technology 
depend on the elasticities of supply and demand and 
the changes that take place in the location of the 
supply and demand curves. 
The elasticity of the demand for food in the United 
States is 'estimated' at about -0.2. The improvements 
in technology moved the supply curve to the right. 
Under these conditions, gross returns to agriculture 
would decline_ 
Gross returns to the individual farm firm, however, 
would not necessarily decline. If, in the extreme case, 
only one farmer adopted the l1ew technology, the 
15 V. W. Ruttan and T. T. Stout. Regional differences in 
factor shares in American agriculture, 1925-57. Jour. Farm 
Econ. 42 :52-68. Feb. 1960. 
TABLE 7. Value of farm real estate per acre, United Siales, 1947-
59" 11947-49=1001. 
Y:...:e::::a::..r __ -,I:.:n:.:::d::..cx:::....:n:.:u:.:n:::,b:.:e:.:.r=-s ____ -=y::..e:.:ar'--_-=I=:ndex numbers 
1947 ___________ 94 1955 ___________ 133 
1948 ___________ 101 1956 ___________ 138 
1949 ________ ~~_105 1957 ___________ 147 1958 ___________ 156 
1950_~ _________ 103 1959 ___________ 168 
1951 ___________ 119 
1952 ___________ 132 
1953_~ ________ . 132 
1954 __________ 128 
• Farmland and buildings as of )Iarch 1. 
Source; U. S. Dept. Agr. Agricultural Outlook Charts. 1960. 
p. 55. 
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Fig. 8. Value of farm real estate up sharply during 1950's. 
effect on total production would be negligible and so 
would the effect on prices. The demand for anyone 
farmer's product is virtually infiuitely elastic'. So 
the gross returns to his farm firm would increase 
pari passu with the increase in its production. 
The net returns would increase also, becallse the 
marginal cost of the new technology would have been 
less than the marginal returns; otherwise the new 
technology would not have been adopted in the first 
place. 
The marginal cost of the new technology in some 
cases would be close to zero (as in thc case of hybrid 
seed corn, which costs only a. very small percentage 
of the marginal return it brings) or negative (as in 
the case of such things as diesel tractors where the 
reduction in total fuel cost is greater than the higher 
initial and upkeep costs, otherwise the diesel tractor 
would not be purchased). In all these cases, net 
returns would increase more than gross returns if 
only one farmer adopted the new technology. 
Obviously, of course, this is only the limitillg case 
at one end of the range of realistic possibilities. The 
limiting case at the other end of the range is the 
situation in which all farmers adopt the new tech-
nology simultaneously. 
This second extreme is used in many discussions of 
farm policy. It is about as unrealistic as the other 
extreme, for a great many farmers are limited in their 
ability to adopt new technology by the topography 
of their farms, the extent of their education and 
managerial ability and so on. 
'1'he actual situation lies somewhere between the 
two extremes. 
Farmers who "get thaI' fustest with the mostest" 
with new technology, therefore, face a demand curve 
which has an elasticity somewhere between infinity 
and -0.2. The net returns to those with an elasticity 
in excess of -1.0 could increase, while those below -0.2 
would decrease unless their costs declined more rapid-
ly than their gross returns, which is unlikely. 
\Vith the passage of a few years of time, the 
number of farmers can decline, as in fact it did during 
the 1950 'so This decline in the number of farmers 
would tend to increase net income per farm, even if 
total net income for agriculture as a ,,"hole were 
declining. It is difficult, however, to measure these 
things empirically. 
2. The effects of some of the farm programs on 
net income per farm have been estimated empirically. 
Acreage allotments rationed the right to plant acres 
to c2rtain crops, and the value of these allotments was 
capitalized into laud values. One study estimated that 
in Pittsylvania COlluty, Virginia, an acre of tobacco 
allotment accounted for $962 of the selling price of 
a farm in 1954 and $1,673 of the selling price in 
] 957,l'i '1'he value of an acre of cropland wit'hout the 
allotment was $22.75. The average ::;ale price of the 
203 farms in the sample was $10,242, and an estimated 
$5,650 (55 percen t of the total value) was paid for 
the right to grow tobacco on a specified number of 
the purchased acres. For the $5,650, the purchaser 
r'2eeived nothing tangible, but ouly a franchise to 
grow tobacco. Similar evidence was found in Greene, 
\Vilson and Pitt cOllnties, North Carolina. 
A study of land values in Kansas yielded similar 
information on the value of wheat allotments. Aceord-
ing to a limited study in two areas in Ka11sa::;, the 
right to grow wheat add2d substantial value to wheat 
laud. The value added was not of the order of 
magnitUde indicated for tobacco land but was a sub-
stantial percentage of the total value pel' acre. 
3. 'rho developm~~J1t of new technology after \Vorld 
\Var H began to make it profitahle for farmers to 
handle largpt' fal'ms t han before. 'rhe pressnre to 
enlarge their farms may ha.ve led some farmers to 
pay more for an extra 40 or 80 acres than they could 
for a whole farm; in teclmieal terms, the marginal 
retul'll for additional acres was higher than the 
average 1".:1urn for the farm as a whole. In the ycar 
ending in March 1960, 45 percent of all sales of farms 
or tracts of land were for adding to existing farmq. 
The figure in 1950 was only 21 pel'ccnt. l1 
4. After \Yorld \Var II, the prices of farm products 
were high. But farmers could remember the drastic 
price decline that took place soon after \Vorld War 1. 
At first, farmers were not sure that price supports 
16 ]<'. H. "Iaier. J. 1.. Hedrick and 'V. L. Gibson. The sale 
value of flu-cured tobacco allotments. Va. Agr. Rxp. Sta. Tech. 
nul. 148. April 1960. p. 27. - referred to in a paper: The 
economic rolc of land resource institutions in agricultural ad-justment by ·Walter E. Chryst and John F. Timmons, ARS, 
USDA, and Iowa State University. rcspectively, lHay 1960. p. 13. 
17 The price of land bought for farm enlargement early in 1960 
was higher than the price of all land sold in 5 regions, lower 
in 5 others and the same in another region, out of a total of 11 
regions surveyed. (Current developments in the farm real estate 
market. ARS, USDA. Oct. 1960. p. 9). 
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FARM INCOME AND 
REAL ESTATE VALUES 
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Fig. 9. Values of farm income and real estate in dollars per acre. 
would be continued at levels above long-run equili-
brium levels. Figure 9 illustrates the way in which 
land prices rose much less, and much slower, than 
farm incomes.18 But after the Korean conflict, farm-
ers began to feel more certain that supports would be 
continued. This feeling of confidence persisted until 
the index of land prices reached about the same levels 
as the index of farm income. 
5. Finally, a part of the rise in land values during 
the 1950's may be attributed to fear of inflation. 
During 1960, this fear eased to some extent, and this 
may have been partly responsible for the slight decline 
in land values that took place in 1960. 
Why Did Per-Capita Farm Incomes Not Rise? 
There are two chief reasons why per·capita net 
farm income changed so little during the 1950 'so 
1. Continued overpmdttction of farm products re-
lative to the demand for them kept gross national 
farm income low. 
This overproduction didn't result from any increase 
in acreage. Crop acreage has remained unchauged 
at about 350 million acres since 1920, and the decline 
in the demand for feed for horses and mules had 
pretty well run its course by 1950. The overproduction 
resulted mainly from rapid technological advances 
and the addition and substitution of capital resources 
- machinery, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals, etc. 
These were both added to and substituted for labor 
and land and permitted yields per acre to increase 
and one man to handle more acres. 
Production expenses changed also. The Use of 
more efficient production techniques had a tendency 
to lower some costs, but the greater use of commercial 
inputs (i.e., fertilizer) and inflation tended to raise 
costs. The net effect was to decrease net national 
farm income. A corresponding decline in the number 
18 "We would suspect ... that the benefits of these programs 
have had their greatest impact in improving agricultural welfare 
in those periods in which the uncertainty exlstl~g about t!teir 
continuity was sufficient to preclude them from bemg capitalIzed 
Into land values." (Chryst and Timmons, op. cit .• p. 19). 
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of farmers held per·capita net farm income about 
constant. 
The average yield of feed grains, for example, rose 
more than 33 percent from 1947-49 to 1957. Total 
farm output increased 21 percent, while population 
increased only 19 percent. 
The price of farm products declined, but individual 
farmers continued to adopt new technology and to 
expand the size of their operations in an effort to 
increase their incomes. Total production increas~d 
under the impact of new technology and further 
depressed farm prices. A small increase in supply 
causes a large decrease in prices for farm products 
and almost as la.rge a decrease in gross farm income. 
Consumer income per person also increased. Some 
of this increase was merely inflationary. But re-
latively little of the real increase in consumer incomes 
went for food. Total food consumption tends to rise 
only as popUlation increases - food consumption per 
person remaining remarkably steady. Wi1:!h United 
States consumer incomes now at relatively high levels, 
further increases in income add to the demand for 
some farm products but decrease the demand for 
others. This doesn't have much effect on total food 
consumption. 
Continued overproduction in relation to demand, 
then, is the first reason that farm incomes didn't rise 
during the 1950 'so This kept national gross farm 
income low. 
2. Another kind of imbala1!ce is the second reason 
that per-capita farm incomes didn't rise. We can 
call this imbalance an excessive supply of farmers in 
terms of the number that could earn incomes com-
parable to those for similar ability in other occupa-
tions. Along with the overproduction of farm prod-
ucts, this kept income per fannC1' low. 
The large supply of farm operators relative to the 
demand for them resulted from two things: (1) the 
high farm birth rate and the difficulties which impede 
movement off farms, thus keeping the supply of 
farmers excessive, and (2) the decline in the number 
of farms as they became larger and fewer, thus reduc-
ing the demand for farm operators. 
The farm population declined along with the decline 
in the number of farms (from a peak of 32 million 
persons in 1933 to 21 million in. 1959), but it did not 
decline fast enough to permit per-capita farm incomes 
to rise during the J 950 'so This relative oversupply of 
farmers meant dividing up the total agricultural in-
come pie into relatively small pieces and bidding up 
the rent and priCe of land. This kept net income 
per farmer low. An oversupply of farmers depresses 
farm incomes per farmer just as surplus farm prod-
uct.s depress farm-product prices per bushel, bale, etc., 
of product. 
The farm birth rate alone is high enough to result 
in a continuous increase in the number of farmers 
if all boys born on farms stay in farming. Farm 
births exceed farm deaths by about 400,000 per year. 
In 1950, the number of farm children was 68 percent 
higher than the number needed to maintain a station-
ary farm population. 
But we don't need even a stationary farm popula-
tion. The demand for farmers is declining, and 
farming practices have become much more labor-
saving. Greater mechanization and machinery size 
have increased the size of farm that a family can 
handle. The average size of farm in the United States 
increased from 175 acres in 1940 to 217 acres in 
1950 and to 245 acres in 1954. The number of 
commercial farms dropped 21 percent from 1947-49 to 
1955-57_ 
EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAMS ON THE LOCATION 
OF FEED-GRAINS PRODUCTION 
There was some concern up to 1959 that corn-
acreage controls and the denying of loans to noncom-
pliers might be driving some corn production out of 
the Corn Belt. Some thought, too, that the substitution 
of corn for controlled crops, such as cotton and 
wheat, was increasing corn production outside of the 
Corn Belt - that is, outside of the original" commer-
cial corn area." 
.. 1938AREA 
_ AREA ADDED 1931 TO 1958 
Figure 10 shows that the commercial corn area19 did 
increase in size- more than 60 percent from 1938 
to 1958. Apparently, however, this was merely a 
result of more counties coming under the definition 
of a commercial corn county as corn yields per acre 
rose. The annual county and state production data 
show that corn production was not "driven out of 
the Corn Belt." Even corn acreage was not driven 
out. 
The annual corn acreage and production data by 
counties show that corn acreage. and production 
became more concentrated, not less concentrated, in 
the original 1938 commercial corn area. Figure 11, 
which illustrates changes in corn acreage, and fig. 12, 
which illustrates changes in corn production, show 
that the same thing is true of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana 
19 The "commercial corn area" includes the counties where 
average corn production during the preceding 10 years was 450 
or more bushels per farm and 4 or more bushels per acre of 
farmland In the county • 
Fig. 10. Original 1938 commercial corn area and counties added since 1938. 
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and Ohio, the four states in the heart of' the Corn 
Belt.20 The figures indicate that this tendency in-
creased even more after 1958 when corn acreage re-
strictions were removed and new corn rates, which 
were lower but were available to all producers, went 
into effect_ 21 The same thing is true for oats. 
Production of hogs also became more concentrated 
in the Corn Belt, as seen in fig. 13. Cattle production 
just 'held its own (fig. 14). 
20 The same result is obtained when Minnesota is substituted 
for Ohio as one of the four Corn Belt states. 
21 Geoffrey Shepherd arld ;Ulan Richards. "Effects of the 
federal programs for corn and other grains on corn prices, feed 
grains production and livestock production. Iowa Agr. and Home 
Econ. Exp. Sta. Res. Bul. 459. Aug. 1958. pp_ 282-285: and 
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EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAMS ON LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION AND PRICES 
The corn storage program was originally set up 
in the belief that stabilizing the flow of eorn into 
consumption also would stabilize livestock production 
and prices. 
This stabilizing effect should be most pronounced 
for hogs, since the bulk of the hogs in the United 
States is raised on corn-producing farms and since 
corn constitutes about 80 percent of their feed. 
There is some evidence that the corn program has 
'had a considerable stabilizing effect on corn prices 
Footnote 21 I continued I 
Geoffrey Shepherd and Kurt Ullrich. Our corn-hog-cattle belt. 
Iowa Farm Science. 14 :437-438. Ames, Iowa. Feb. 1960. 
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and consumptioll.22 " despite its shortcomings, 
the corn program has provided a degree of stabiliza-
tion to the supply of feed.' '2:1 But it docs not appear 
to have had a stabilizing effect on hog production 
and prices. 
Figure 15 shows anuual pork production since 1900. 
The chart shows clearly that the variation in pork 
production increased substantially after 1933 when 
the corn program began. On the face of it, this 
could be regarded as evidence that the corn program 
22 Geoffrey Shepherd and Allen Richards. Effects of the 
federal programs for corn and other grains on COrn prices, 
food grains production and livestock production. Iowa Agr. 
and Home Econ. Exp. Sta. Res. Bu!. 459. pp. 272-276. 285-289. 
Aug. 1958. 
23 H. F. Breimyer. Emerging phenomenon: A cycle in hogs. 
Jour. Farm Econ. 41 :760-68. Nov. 1959. 
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unstabilized pork production rather than stabilized it. 
Study of iig. 15, however, suggests that the increase 
ill the variation in potIt production aiter 1933 resulted 
chiefly irom two unique events, both unrelated to 
the corn program. The sharp decline in pork produc-
tion during the 1930 's came immediately after the 
severe drouths oi 1934 and 1936; the great peak in 
1942 and 1943 carne as a result of the war eifort to 
produce the maximum amount of meat by iull utiliza-
tion of the large crops produced in those years plus 
most of the large supplies of corn carried over from 
the immediate prewar years. This indicates that 
variations in corn· supplies have a controlling iniluence 
on pork production. 
Yet, fig. 16 shows that hog production continued to 
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Fig. 16. Changes in hog slaughter and prices received by farmers. 
vary after World 'War II, when the CCC "stabiliza-
tion " stocks of corn and other feed grains grew to 
large proportions, and this could be expected to 
stabilize hog production. The variation in hog produc-
tion after World 'War II is fully as great as it was 
before the war and the droufhs of the 1930's. 
The variation in hog prices is also great. Figure 16 
shows that hog prices since. the war have varied 
cyclically, inversely with hog slaughter. They appear 
to be about as variable as they were before the drouths 
of 1934 and 1936 and World War II. Breimyer 
believes that the stabilization of feed supplies attained 
under the corn program has had some indirect ttn-
stabilizing effects on hog production. 
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"Current circumstances alter drastically the 
old tie between production of corn and of hogs. 
They assign an entirely new role to hog and 
corn price relationships. No longer must vir-
tually all corn go into production of livestock. 
No longer must hog production adjust so 
quickly to the corn supply. Variations in the 
hog-corn ratio now more often arise from 
changes in the price of hogs and less often from 
changes in the price of corn. The ratio now 
has more direct effect on hog prodUction than 
before - on its own, and not merely as a reflec-
tion of the size of the corn supply. As such it 
plays a more active role in regulating hog pro-
duction; and yet it is less effective than it ap-
peared to be when only a go-between."24 
According to Breimyer's view, the hog-corn price 
ratio has become a less effective regulator of hog 
production because hog production now responds less 
to variations in corn production (the impact of which 
is reduced by the COrn storage program) and more to 
hog prices. And hog prices tend to induce cyclic 
variations in hog production, because of t'he inherent 
time-lag in the response of production to prices. Hog 
production, therefore, is becoming more cyclic in 
character. This cyclic variability in the price of hogs 
is replacing to a considerable extent the earlier irregu-
lar variability that resulted from irrcgular variations 
in corn supplies. 
In addition, there is some evidence that the elasti-
city of the demand for hogs is less now t'han it was 
before World War II. The USDA and other.s esti-
mated thc elasticity before the 'War at about -0.6. The 
estimatcs for thc period since the war range from -0.33 
to -0.39.25 This decrease in the elasticity of the demand 
for hogs has increased the size of the hog price varia-
tion that. results from a given variation in hog produc-
tion. The hog industry is more internally unstable 
than before. 
This raises the question of whether a. feed-grain 
stabilization program alone can stabilize hog produc-
tion and prices. It can stabilize hog production 
against irregular variation resulting from irregular 
variations in corn and other feed-grains production, 
but apparently it cannot stabilize hog production 
against internally created, self-perpetuating cyclic 
variations which result from cyclic variations in hog 
prices. That requires measures which deal directly 
with hog prices. 
One of the most likely mcasures would be direct 
payments to hog producers, with the" support" price 
level (below which payments would be made) set a 
little lower than the long-run average market price 
level. This would smooth out returns from hogs, in 
effect smoothing out hog prices and thus stabilizing 
h015 production.26 
Statements are frequently made that government 
price-support programs in agriculture are useless. 
Critics point that, in the case of corn, surpluses are 
overwhelming and corn prices still are low, but in 
the livestock industry, where no programs are in 
24 Ibid., p. 764. 
25 Letters from Earl E. Miller, SHR Branch. AMS. USDA, July 
22 and 29, 1958, and research conducted by 'Wilbur Maki. Dept. 
Econ. and Soc., Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
26 Geoffrey Shepherd, Don Kaldor and Francis Kutish. Let's 
think about hog supplies and prices! Iowa Farm Science. 
13 :255-258. Junc 1959. 
effect, there are no surpluses and prices are more 
nearly satisfactory. 
The evidence given in this kind of statement is 
invalid. The chief reason why livestock prices are 
reasonably good is that supplies are reasonably well 
adjusted to market demand; and the chief reason for 
that is that the corn and other feeds programs have 
held a substantial percentage of the feed supply off 
the market. If these supplies had been fed to live-
stock instead, livestock production would have been 
substantially greater, and livestock prices would have 
been substantially lower. This subject is discussed in 
greater detail in a latcr section. 
RELATIONSHIP OF WHEAT AND 
FEED-GRAINS PROGRAMS27 
Feed grains and wheat are inseparable public policy 
problems for the decade ahead, as in those past. These 
crops are the major production alternatives on most 
of the crop land in the United States. Events of 
1953-55 help to remind us of this. While wheat 
plantings declined by 21 million acres from 1953 to 
1955 in response to the national wheat allotment and 
marketing quota program (the situation by regions 
is shown in fig. 17), oat plantings rOSe by 4 million 
acres, and barley and sorghum for grain rose by 
nearly 7 million acres each. 
These shifts occurred in most areas of the United 
States. In four Northern Plains states, a decline of 
6 million acres of wheat and 1 million acres of corn 
from ] 953 to 1955 was offset by an increase of 5 
million acres in three other feed grains. In eight 
Mountain states, 3 million fewer acres of wheat were 
countered by 2 million acres more of feed grains. In 
three Pacific states, the exchange was about equal -
1.4 million acres. 
Even in five states in the heart of the Corn Belt, 
wheat harvested fell by nearly 2 million acres from 
27 This section on wheat was prepared by John A. Schnlttker 
of Kansas State University. A detailed discussion of wheat 
programs Is found In his: 'Vheat problems and programs in 
the United States. Mo. Agr. Exp. Sta. Res. Bu!. 753. (North 
Central Regional Publication No. 118.) Sept. 1960. 
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Fig. 17. Acreage of wheat seeded by regions in the United States. 
1953 to ]955, while corn acreage remained constant 
and other feed-grains acreage rose by 1.3 million. 
As wheat regions turned to feed grains, a small 
increase took place in the Corn Belt share of total 
wheat planted. This occurred partly because growers 
with fewer than 15 acres of wheat were exempted 
from compliance with acreage allotments. Most grow-
ers using this exemption were in the Corn Belt and 
Northeast. In the late 1950's, more than half a million 
wheat growers planted over 4 million acres and 
produc·ed about 100 million bushels each year on ex-
empted acreage. 
The shift of feed·grain acreage to wheat was very 
modest, however, compared with the change from 
wheat to feed grains in the Great Plains and North· 
west. Many farmers with wheat allotments did not 
Use them, even though their neighbors were moving 
into wheat production under the exemption described. 
In 1959, for example, 514,000 farms with 4.3 million 
acres wheat allotment, and located chiefly in the 
eastern half of the United States, planted no wheat. 
This helped offset shifts to wheat by others. 
As the 1960's begin, wheat is clearly the most 
visible and possibly the most pressing farm policy 
problem. The USDA estimates that wheat stocks by 
mid-1961 will be 1.5 billion bushels. :Most of this will 
be Hard Red Winter Wheat, as shown in fig. 18. 
Under the existing program, an average of 100·200 
million bushels should be expected to be added to 
stocks each year. A program which simply reduced 
wheat marketings to the sum of domestic food, exports, 
seed and the usual amount of wheat fed, would add 5 
to 10 million tons of grain to an overburdened feed-
grain market. Under present law, the result would 
probably be an increase in the growth of feed·grain 
stocks by about the amount of the decrease in the 
growth of wheat stocks. 
A farm program which terminatcd wheat acreage 
allotments and priced all grains as feed without sub· 
stantially reducing total resource use through land 
retirement or other means would also transfer excess 
wheat·producing capacity either to feed grains or 
leave it producing for government, as at present. It 
wonld matter little whether or not wheat growers who 
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shifted to sorghums and barley in 1954 returned to 
former production patterns. Potentially, all grain 
produced would be feed grain. 
If farm prices are to be maintained ncar 1960 
levels in subsequent years, and if commodity stocks 
are to be reduced, a reduction in total farm-resource 
use appears n€cessary. It would be a significant im-
provement over present law if wheat marketings 
were effectively reduced to a little less than total 
disappearance and if resourcef': now devoted to produc-
tion of excess wheat for stocks were turned to some 
conservation uSc at the same time. 
This need not be of positive direct benefit to feed-
grain or wheat producers, but it would benefit tax-
payerf':. Aftcr 6 years of improving one commodity 
sitnation at the expense of another, it would be a 
welcome innovation. 
The most pressing need with respect to wheat is 
to reduce the carryover to not more than half the 
present level. To do this, acquistions of new wheat 
by the CCC must be ended. Only a program of 
effective control over production or marketings of 
wheat can establish real control over wheat stocks, 
and thus over budgct expenditures by the federal 
government in the next few years. There is nothing 
to indicate that wheat production would decline if 
the wheat price were to be cut by as much as one-
third from 1960, and there is every reason to believe 
it would increase. 
Whatever the price level for wheat and farm 
products from 1D61 to 1%5, administrative controls 
hold the only real hope for successful reductions in 
wheat carryover by 1965. Once that is achieved, 
discussion of a new wheat program for the long run 
can begin. 
EFFECTS OF THE FEED-GRAINS PROGRAMS 
ON THE DAIRY INDUSTRY28 
It is difficult indeed to state with preCISIOn what 
the impact of the feed-grain programs 'has been on 
such aggregate statistics as number of dairy farms, 
level of milk production and milk prices, cost of dairy 
feeds and other important national dairy statistics. 
There are several important reasons for this. 
The dairy industry is very widely dispersed and 
subject to a wide variety of influences, even though 
heavy production occurs along the northern edge of 
the Corn Belt and in the New England and :Mid-
Atlantic states. The alternative employment oppor-
tunities for dairy farm resources diffcr so widely from 
region to r·egion that changes ill these alternatives 
often obscure the impacts of changing feed supplies 
and prices. The heavy investment in f':pecialized 
facilities and livestock and the regularit~T of dairy 
income tend to reduce the response rate of dairy 
farmers to forccs originating in the rest of agriculture 
and even in the nonfarm economy. In truth, the 
dairy industry is among the most stable in agriculture. 
Efforts at isolating' and quantifying the economic 
relations on the supply side of the dairy industry on 
a national basis have met with very limited success, 
28 This section was prepared by Harlow HalYorson, Depart-
ment of Agr. Eeon., Un i\'. of 'ViS .• Madison. 
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largely for the reasons just stated. In spite of 
several studies dcsigned to quantify the impact on 
milk production of such factors as milk, beef and hog 
prices and feed supplies, further reflection suggests 
the esscntial futility of deriving very meaningful 
and useful conclusions from such national aggregative 
data. If this is true, it would be superfluous to 
attempt to appraise aggregative results of the feed-
grain programs. 
A more promising approach, although much less 
fully explored, lies in the analysis of program effects 
on certain local areas or typical farms (by some 
definition) . 
Outside of the Corn Belt, a considerable proportion 
of the dairy farms are deficit with respect to con-
centrates but amply supplied with roughages. Feed 
concentrates are imported in considerable volume into 
the northeastern states, for example. To the extent 
that the feed-grain program has maintained and 
raised feed-grain prices, this program may have had 
a depressing effect on the dairy industry in these 
areas. It should be noted, however, that substantial 
increases in freig'ht rates in the postwar period also 
have been an important element in the feed costs of 
such producers. At the same time, the changes in 
formula pricing for Class I milk under federal and 
state controlled milk markets have given \veight to 
changes in feed costs which thus have tended to offset 
the influence of program-generated increases in feed 
costs. It may well be that the continuing and ample 
f':upplies of feed grains have added to the already high 
degree of stability of milk production, although grain 
movement in relation to local production has not been 
examined. For that part of the dairy industry which 
supplies fluid milk markets, it is probably safe to say 
that steps were taken to ensure that the feed-grain 
program would not have serious reperCl1f':SiOllS on milk 
production or producer incomes. 
In the Corn Belt, the dairy enterprise mnst compete 
for farm resources with the hog and beef enterprises. 
The choice of which enterprise to use in converting 
the available supply of feed grains into cash income 
is usually not difficult. The relatively heavy invest-
ment in herd and facilitief':, the confining nature of 
the dairy enterprise and relatively low labor income 
from it usually make it the least desirable of several 
alternatives. On the other hand, the regularity of the 
income from milk and the availability of the skimmilk 
by-product has led many farmers to milk production 
as a supplemental enterprise, particularly with hogs. 
Eut since resources (Lwoted to milk production in the 
Corn Belt probably can be shifted most readily to 
beef production, changes in the beef-cattle cycle in-
volve :,wme transfer of resources between the beef 
and uail'Y enterprises. In Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, 
for example, it has been "hown that during 1944-58 
a 10-percent chang'e in the milk-beef price ratio led 
to a 1.5-percent change in milk production in the 
following year, while similar changes in the milk-hog' 
and milk-fecd price ratios were statistically nonsigni-
ficant.20 Thus one can probably conclude that short-
run direct impactf': of the feed-grain program wOl'king 
20 U. S. Dept. Ag-r., Agr. Mktg. Servo The Dairy Situation. 
No,'. 1959. pp. 13-18. 
through feed prices were probably much overshadow-
ed by influences working through the beef-cattle en-
terprise in the Corn Belt. 
In Iowa and several states to t'he west and south, 
the combination of several factors probably has had 
important impacts on dairying. The relatively higher 
support for feed grain, plus the more rapid growth 
in technology in feed production, have tended to place 
the dairy enterprise at a disadvantage. On the other 
hand, growth in population has led to increased op-
portunities to market fluid milk and thus improve 
blend prices. In addition, a gradual shift toward 
marketing whole milk rather than farm-separated 
cream has meant small increases in returns from the 
nonfat solids part of milk for those producers with 
manufactured product outlets. In Nebraska and 
Kansas, however, these offsetting influences have not 
been sufficient to stop the steady decline in milk 
production. In most of the remaining states of the 
western Corn Belt, increases in milk production have 
lagged far behind increases in production of other 
farm products. 
Thus it is likely ~hat the short-run impacts of the 
feed-grain program on the dairy industry have been 
relatively minor, espccially when considered in rela-
tion to the overshadowing influences of factors out-
side the program. The major program impacts prob-
ably have been exerted on dairying in the western 
part of the Corn Belt, if one were to assume that part 
of the post-war increases in Class I prices in eastern 
markets would not have come about in the absence of 
a feed-grain price-support program. 
AREA PROBLEMS 
Agriculture is a heterogenous industry, and the 
low income problem is more severe in some types of 
farming than it is in others. 
Differences in Returns Among Type-of-Farming Areas 
Table 8 shows that there are wide differences among 
farm incomes in the different type-of-farming areas. 
The average returns to operator and family labor in 
1959 ranged from -$4,336 in New Jersey egg-produc-
ing poultry farms to $17,112 in the large-scale cotton 
farms of the Mississippi Delta.30 
Furthermore, these differences persist over long 
periods of time. Figure 1H shows the net returns 
data for two types of farming - hog-beef raising and 
hog-beef fattening - in two partly contiguous areas, 
earried back to ] 930, along with the earnings of 
manufacturing workers. 
Thus fig_ 19 illustrates the essence of the area farm 
problem in summary form. It shows that the urban 
income series rises fairly steadily over most of the 
period. But the farm returns series jumps all over 
the place - in the ease of the hog-beef fattening 
series, from roughly three times as high as the urban 
series in 1948 to only half us 'high in 1955. The 
instubility of the farm returns series stands out in 
~o This sItuation is discussed more fully In: Geoffrey Shep-
herd. Farm programs for farm incomes. Jour. Farm Econ. 
42 :~39-50. Aug. 1960. 
TABLE 8. Return to operator and family labor, 1956-59. 
Type-of-farmlng area 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Dairy farms: 
Central Northeast _________ $ 2,847 $3,046 $ 2,474 $ 2,386 
Eastern Wisconsin ________ 1,154 1,137 605 853 
·Western Wisconsin ________ 2,019 2,147 2,289 1,542 
Dairy-hog farms: 
Southeastern Minnesota ____ 2.497 2,179 
Corn Belt farms: Hog-dairy ________________ 3,388 
Hog-beef _________________ 1,715 
Hog-beef fattening ________ 4,486 
Cash graIn _______________ 5,738 
Poultry farms: 
New Jersey (egg-produc-ing) ___________________ _ 255 
Cotton farms: 
Southern PIedmont ________ 713 
Texas: Black PrairIe ___________ -300 
High Plains (nonirri-
4,179 
2,197 
5,312 
2,219 
-320 
606 
309 
gated) _______________ 825 4,192 
High Plains (irrigated) __ 8,923 6,321 
MISSissippi Delta: Small __________________ 1,485 
Large-scale ____________ 15.303 
Peanut-cotton farms: 
Southern Coastal Plains____ 2,200 
Tobacco farms: 
Kentucky: 
838 
3,897 
1,619 
Tobacco-livestock _______ 2,221 1,675 
North Carolina: 
1,967 
4,774 
2,776 
7,822 
1,726 
-636 
1,187 
1,254 
5,814 
12,190 
611 
4,531 
2,606 
1,940 
Tobacco-cotton __________ 2,550 1,109 1,927 
Tobacco-cotton (large) __ 2,938 695, 1,877 
Tobacco (small) ________ 2,400 1,429 1,934 
Spring wheat farms: 
Northern Plains: 
·Wheat-small grain-live-
stock _________________ 5,326 2,066 
'Vheat-corn-livestock ____ 1,671 3,422 
Wheat-roughage-livestock 1,432 2,809 
'Vinter wheat farms: 
Southern Plains: Wheat _________________ 700 2,883 
Wheat-grain-sorghum ___ -670 1,253 
Pacific Northwest: Wheat-pea ______________ 7,330 6,527 
Wheat-fallow ___________ 3.318 9,258 
Cattle ranches: 
Northern Plains ________ -701 910 
Intermountain Region ___ 3,221 5,423 
Southwest ______________ -6,471 -1,186 
Sheep ranches: 
Northern Plains ________ 2,773 6,965 
Southwest ___________ -6,366 -2,293 
3,824 
4,856 
2,481 
8,493 
6,856 
663 
5,601 
2,413 
8.914 
1,506 
8,087 
762 
1,432 
3,546 
1,003 
4,189 
82 
-4,336 
654 
713 
2,939 
6,781 
1,335 
17.112 
1,518 
1.560 
1,292 
1,016 
1,531 
207 
-501 
-1,254 
4,343 
4,964 
7,156 
4,559 
1,026 
7,831 
435 
3,164 
463 
Source: Farm costs and returns: Commercial family operated 
farms by type and location. U. S. Dept. Agr.. Agr. Inf. Bul. 
176. 1960. 
marked contrast to the stability of the urban income 
series. 
This instability not only is disturbing in itself; high 
returns in some periods induce high investment in 
land, for example, whieh is difficult to payoff in 
periods of low returns. 
The chart shows also that the two farm series differ 
greatly from each other. In most years, t.he returns 
to operator and family labor arc about twice as high 
in hog-beef fattening as they are in hog-beef raising. 
Similar differences exist among per-eapita farm 
incomes by regions. Table 9 shows that per-capita 
farm income in the Pacific region is more than three 
times as high as in the East South-Central region. 
It is also higher than the per-capita nonfarm ineome 
in the Pacific region. 
Tables 8 and 9 and fig. 19 suggest several things: 
1. "The low farm income problem" is not simply 
" a" problem, affecting all areas alike. Farm incomes 
in some type-of-farming areas arc low; in some other 
areas. they arc higher than factory workers' ineomes. 
2. Perhaps some of the differences in income result 
from the difficulty of getting accurate detailed income 
data in the first place. If so, more detailed methods 
may be needed. These would reveal additional in-
formation, such as t'lle distribution of ineomes behind 
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TABLE 9. Regional distribution of farm·nonfarm income differences, 
1955. 
Income per capita 
I': ., 1':2;", 
'a, 
0 '8 0 0"-"" <Il bC I::: '- tO~ :bIlX ... ., ...... 0 
~ to S ... ;g ~~ -;~"'f' .... ~ s.o~ I': ... 
.... 
.... .. 
0 to A ~~,g o~~ Z r;., e-- 0O 00 
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (thou- (thou· 
sands) sand 
Northeast __________ 2,175 1,218 957 1,420 
dollars) 
1,359 
East North-CentraL_2,182 1,082 1,100 3,003 3,303 
West North-CentraL_1,861 957 904 3,301 2,984 
South Atlantic _____ 1,521 879 642 3,533 2,268 
East South-CentraL_1,366 751 615 3,105 1,910 
West South-CentraL_1,577 1,121 456 2.318 1,057 Mountain __________ 1,726 1,353 373 725 271 Pacific ____________ 2,215 2,575 -360 840 -302 
United States 
---- --
704· 18,245 12,850 
• Estimates of nonfarm income per capita consist of estimated 
total personal income of the entire population. both farm and 
nonfarm, as shown in the Survey of Current Business, August 
1958, u. S. Dept. Commerce, less estimated farm-operator family 
income, divided by the Bureau of the Census estimate of total 
population July 1, 1955 (excluding armed forces overseas) less 
estimated population in farm-operator households. 
b Per-capita income of farm-operator households consists of (1) the net Income of farm operators from farming, as reported 
in the Farm Income Situation, FIS-175, September 1959, plus 
(2) the off-farm income of farm·operator families, based on 
data reported in the Survey of Farmers' Expenditures 1955, 
December 1956, U. S. Dept. Agr., and U. S. Dept. Commerce, 
divided by the estimated population of farm-operators' house· 
holds, as reported In the Survey of Farmers' Expenditures. 1955. 
• Computed by dividing U. S. total gap by total population of 
farm-operator households. 
SOI~rcB 01 tablB: R. H. Masucci. Regional differences in per 
capita farm and nonfarm income. Agl"lr.ultural Economics 
Research Vol. XII, No.!. January 1960. Page 2. 
the average income. Such information would cost 
money. But when billions of dollars are being spent 
to increase farm income, a few hundred thousand 
dollars spent on increasing the coverage and detail 
of the basic income data, if that is needed to show 
more accurately what the farm income problem is in 
the first place, would be a good investment. 
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3. ~Iore research is needed to determine why in· 
comes in some areas are persistently low, This research 
is needed to provide a basis for area programs to deal 
with these low-income areas. The low incomes are 
not a matter of poor soil or weather; some of the 
poorest soil and weather is to be found in the Inter· 
mountain region, where the average income is among 
the highest in the country. They are more likely a 
matter of farm organization and adjustment. 
4. Study of the data from which these costs and 
returns are compiled throws light on the nature of the 
farm income problem. I t indicates that underlying 
the income problem is a basic problem of maladjust· 
ment. Some types of farming have been able to bene· 
fit from the technological revolution, either because 
they were more flexible and adjustable than others or 
because the effects of the costs and revolution on their 
quantities produced, for the time being, have been 
greater than the adverse effects on their prices. Other 
types of farming have not been able to adjust so well, 
and incomes from these types of farming have suf-
fered. 
Thus, low farm incomes are symptoms rather than 
basic diseases. Simply bolstering incomes, by direct 
payments for example, without doing something about 
the causes of the low incomes, would be no more 
effective after a few years than supporting prices has 
been. The basic problem in agriculture is a problem 
of adjustment in a rapidly changing world. 
OVER-ALL EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS 
It is apparent that price-support programs imple, 
mented by storage operations are inefficient and only 
temporarily and partially effective. The reason for 
this is that they were based upon an incorrect diag-
nosis of the agricultural problem in the first place. 
The agricultural problem was diagnosed as a price 
problem, ignoring quantities and costs. In reality, the 
agricultural problem is an income problem, and it is 
not a total·gross agricultural income problem, but a 
net-per-farmer income problem. This net-per-farmer 
income problem in turn is the result of a still more 
basic problem-a problem of maladjustment to rapid 
technological change. This problem requires quite 
different programs from those that might solve a 
price problem. 
Incorrect Diagnosis Led to Incorrect Prescription 
The original incorrect diagnosis, leading to an in· 
correct prescription, is, in fact, making the patient 
worse. It is impeding rather than promoting the ad· 
justments needed to cure the actual disease. The 
price-support programs are like cough syrup pres-
cribed for a cough that is caused by tuberculosis 
rather than by a simpl() cold. They temporarily 
relieve the symptoms, but in this case they actually 
make the patient worse instead of better. They not 
only leave the real disease untreated; they accelerate 
its development. 
The real malady that creates the symptom of low 
net income per farmer is composed of two different 
diseases, both afflicting the patient at the same time. 
1. Galloping overproduction. The first disease is 
galloping overproduction of farm products relative to 
the demand for them. This results not from any 
increase in acreage - acreage of crops harvested has 
remained practically constant at about 350 million 
since ] 920 - but from a rapid increase in yields 
because of technological advance. T·he average yield 
of feed grains, for example, has risen more than 70 
percent since 1!l37 -41. 
This disease is not cured by price supports above 
long-run open-market levels; instead, it is made worse. 
The high price supports induce still greater produc-
tion, while at the same time reducing consumption. 
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Both of these together result in the accumulation of 
large surplus stocks. 
The mechanism is shown in fig. 20. The point 
,,,,here the demand and supply curves intersect re-
presents long-run equilibrium. Supporting prices 
abovc this level reduces consumption and increases 
production. The resulting surplus piles up in eee 
storage. 
2. Continuous oVCI'supply of farmers. The second 
disease is a continuous oversupply of farmers relative 
to the demand for thcm. This oversupply results from 
two things - the high birth rate on farms and the 
decline in the number of farms as farms get larger and 
fewer. The resulting continuing excess of farmers 
divides the total agricultural income pie into relative· 
ly small pieces and bids up the rent and price of land; 
this keeps net-per-farmer income low. 
As the number of farms in the United States 
declines, fewer farmers are needed. The farm popula-
tion has declined in absolute numbers from a peak of 
32,393,000 in 1933 to less than 20,000,000 in 195!l. 
But this decline in numbers of farmers has not been 
rapid enough to keep up with the decline in the 
demand for farmers. Accordingly, there has been 
a continuing surplus of farmers. Surpluses of farmers 
depress farm incomes per farmer just like surpluses 
of farm products depress the prices of those products. 
What Storage Programs Can Do and Cannot Do 
Storage programs obviously cannot handle these 
problems of overproduction of farm products and 
ovcrsupply of farmers. 
Storage programs are suitable and workable pro-
grams for smoothing out variations in prices caused 
by variations in production that result from variations 
in weat,her. This smoothing out of prices is a valuable 
objective, and storage programs can attain it. Loan 
rates set at long-run market equilibrium levels would 
do the job. 
This is the job that the storage programs were 
originally set up to do - to smooth out the variations 
in prices about their long-run frec-market levels. nut 
they have been misuscd for a different job - to raise 
those long-run levels too, or at least to keep them from 
declining or to retard the decline. 
The storage programs are completely unsuitable and 
unworkable for this job. They do not touch the 
causes of the decline in prices and incomes - the 
overproduction of farm products and the oversupply 
of farmers. Storage programs cannot cope with over-
production. 'What goes into storage must come out. 
Thc overproduction of farm products can only be 
cured by increasing consumption to match the in-
creased production, or by reducing production to 
matrh the existing consumption, or some of both. 
Thc same is true of the excessive supply of farmers. 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The agricultural problem results from two things: 
(1) the technological revolution on farms which in-
creases production more rapidly than demand in-
creases and (2) a continuously excessive number of 
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farmers, caused by the high birth rate on farms and 
the decline in the demand for farmers as productivity 
per man increases. 
This problem affects all agricultural areas and 
types of farming. It is a national problem, requiring 
national programs to deal 'With it. But it is morc 
severe in some areas than in others; so different 
programs are required for the different areas, in 
addition to the national programs. 
We will outline alternative national programs first 
and then suggest the nature of possible area programs. 
National Programs to Deal With Overcapacity 
What is needed is a continuing solution of the 
national agricultural overcapacity problem that would 
be in line with national objeetives. This sort of 
solution requires the development of programs that 
would attain the long-run objective of full employ-
mcnt of those amounts and qualities of agricultural 
land, labor and capital which could earn returns com-
parable with the returns that they could earn in 
other sectors of the economy ~ and do it relatively 
quickly and humanely and in such a way that over· 
capacity would not immediately reoccur. 
The demand for farm products in the United States 
cannot be expanded sufficiently to use up the over· 
eapacity.31 Neither does it appear likely that further 
expansion of foreign demand could do the job. The 
next most likely alternative, then, is to seek some 
means of reducing the supply. 
Return Agriculture to the Open Market 
It seems unlikely that agricultural production 
would be reduced by production control programs as 
a permanent agricultural policy. To keep productive 
resources permanently unemployed likc this would not 
be in line with the "full employment" objectives of 
the nation as a whole. This had led some observers 
to conclude that the best thing to do with agriculture 
is to return it to the open market, let uncontrolled 
supply and demand set prices and let those open-mar-
ket prices reduce production and increase consumption 
until the two come into equality and surpluses dis-
appear for good. 
In this situation, loan rates would be lowered to 
long-run market levels, so that the storage programs 
would simply smooth out prices - more or less com-
pletely stabilize them - at long-run market equilib-
rium levels. 
The trouble with setting loan rates at long-run 
free-market levels, however, is that over the next 5 or 
10 years those levels would provide unduly low in-
comes for most farmers - incomes below the levels 
for comparable resources in other occupations. 
The levels of prices and incomes that would result 
were estimated independel1tly by two different groups 
of research workers late in 1959 - onc in the USDA 
and the other at Iowa State University. The cstimates 
are given in tables 10 through 12. The assumptions 
on which the estimates are based are given with the 
tables. 
31 J. M. 'Vetmore. M. E. Abel. E. 'V. Learn and W. 'v. 
Cochrane. Expanding the demand for farm food products. Minn. 
Agr. Exp. Sta. Tech. Bul. 231. April 1959. 
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These low prices and incomes would eventually 
drive the most disadvantaged farmers out of farming, 
into other occupations or on relief. It would have 
similar effects on farmland and capital. This would 
help to reduce thc land, labor and capital in agricul-
ture so that those left in agriculture could earn better 
returns. 
This, however, would take a long time. And it 
would be a grinding, inhumane process if left to itself. 
It probably would create some poverty pockets or 
areas in agriculture, perhaps of considerable size, 
where farmers would be too poor and untrained to be 
able to move out into better jobs, so that the poverty 
areas would continue to exist for many years. They 
would be perpetuated rather than eliminated by low 
prices. 
The working of the law of supply and demand in 
the open market eventually would tend to drive 
marginal farmers and arcas out of farming. But the 
obstacles to exit from farming are so great that low 
incomes in agriculture would persist for many years. 
Is there not some more humane way of getting the 
job done? 
Kind of Production-Control Program Needed 
What is needed is a temporary production-control 
program that would bring about the same kind of 
reduction in agricultural production and numbers of 
farmers (in terms of total quantity) and numbers, 
location and product-mix, that would result if the 
open market could bring about efficient reallocations 
of production and factors of production quickly and 
painlessly. 
That is to say: The open market eventually would 
maximize efficiency in line with the long-run objec-
tives of society by reducing production and the 
number of farmers on some farms and in some areas. 
Therefore, any temporary agricultural production-
redueing program also should reduce production and 
the number of farmers on some farms and in some 
areas-but do it permanently and quickly. 
How could the program also do it painlessly y It 
conld do it painlessly by employing the welfare 
economics principle of compensation. 
Welfare Economics Principle of Compensation 
Welfare economies recognizes that in a situation 
where a change in technology benefits some and harms 
others, it is impossible to measure the good against 
the harm and say that the one is greater or less than 
the other. In technical economic terms, interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (satisfaction) are impossible. 
No one can prove directly that the benefits of a new 
invention to one person or group are greater, or less, 
than the 'harm to another person or group that is 
temporarily, or in some cases permanently, thrown 
out of work by the new invention. But one can prove 
indirectly whether the benefits are greater than the 
harm if the person or group that is benefited can 
fully compensate the person or group that is harmed 
and still have some of the benefit left. In t'l~at case, 
the invention will have made one person or group 
better off and no person or group 'Worse off, so there 
is a net gain to society as a whole. 
TABLE 10. Prices of livestock products and crops, 1956-59 actual 
and 1959-63 projected, under free-market conditions. 
Year beginning Oct. 1 
t- oo 
'" 
<:> .... 
'" '" '? LQ '? '" or or or , , 
'" 
t- oo 
'" 
<:> .... 
'" LQ LQ IQ lQ 
'" '" '" 
'" '" '" '" '" '" 
co ,... 
.... 
"'" 
.... .... .... .... 
Livestock 
Hogs ($/cwt.) ____ 17.40 19.00 15.70 13.50 14.20 12.80 11.00 
Beef cattle 
($/cwt.) _______ 17.20 21.90 23.00 22.00 20.90 lS.50 12.00 
Lambs ($/cwt.) __ 19.90 21.00 19.50 18.90 19.10 17.30 16.20 
Broilers (c/lb.) ___ 18.9 18.5 16.2 16.80 15.90 15.40 13.40 
Turkeys (c/lb.) __ 23.4 23.9 22.8 22.30 21.80 19.50 17.10 
Eggs (c/doz.) ____ 35.8 38.3 31.5 33.0 33.5 30.0 28.3 
Milk ($/cwt.) ____ 4.21 4.13 4.05 3.91 3.66 3.43 2.67 
Farm chickens (c/lb.) ________ 13.6 13.9 13.3 13.0 12.60 11.40 10.00 
Crops 
0.77 Corn ($/bu.) ____ 1.29 1.12 1.13 1.06 0.79 0.66 
Wheat ($/bu.) ___ 1.97 1.93 1.72 1.71 1.67 0.90 0.74 
Cotton ($/Ib.) ___ 0.335 0.344 0.345 0.315 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Source: Geoffrey Shepherd. Arnold Paulsen. Francis Kutish. 
Don Kaldor. Richard Heifner and Gene Futrell. Production. 
price and income estimates and projections for the feed-livestock 
economy under specified control and market-clearing conditions. 
Iowa Agr. and Home Econ. Exp. Sta. Spec. Rpt. 27. 1960. p. 17. 
Assumptions for Table 10: 
1. Continued growth of United States population and per-
capita income at the same rates as in recent years. 
2. Stocks of grain maintained at 1959 levels. 
3. Feed-grain yields continuing to rise at the same rates 
as the trend rates 1939-59. 
4. Export subsidies on farm products eliminated. 
5. Average weather. 
6. All production controls removed. 
7. The conservation reserve continued through the 1960 
crop year with an additional 5 million acres added in 
1960 to bring the total to 28 million acres. No new 
contracts would be signed for 1961 or later years. Old 
contracts would not be renewed as they expired. 
8. General price stability. 
TABLE 11. Prices received by farmers - Projections based on 
Ellender assumptions, 1960-65, with comparisons. 
Aver-
Commodity Unit age. 1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
1955-
Livestock: 
Cattle ______ $/cwt. 
Hogs _______ $/c""t. 
Milk. whole-
sale _______ $/cwt. 
Butterfat ___ c/lb. 
Eggs _______ c/doz. 
Broilers ____ c/lb. 
Crops: 
Corn _______ $/bu. 
Oats _______ $/bu. 
Barley _____ $/bu. 
Sorghum grain _____ $/cwt. 
Wheat _____ $/bu. 
Rice ________ $/cwt. 
Cotton _____ c/lb. 
Soybeans ___ $/bu. 
Peanuts ____ c/lb. 
Cottonseed __ $/ton 
Tobacco. aILc/lb. 
Flue-cured _c/lb. 
Burley ____ c/lb. 
57 
15.90 21.90 20.0019.0017.50 15.50 15.0015.00 
15.7019.6012.8011.2011.2011.2011.2011.20 
4.12 4.12 3.65 3.65 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 
59.2 58.5 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 64.0 64.0 
37.8 38.3 38.0 31.0 30.0 29.5 29.0 29.0 
21.2 18.5 17.5 16.0 15.5 15.5 15.0 15.0 
1.25 1.11 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
0.66 0.58 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
0.95 0.89 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
1.93 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
1.96 1.72 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
4.93 4.81 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
31.2233.1024.5025.0026.0025.0027.5025.00 
2.16 2.00 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 
11.1 10.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
49.70 43.80 35.00 34.00 33.00 32.00 32.00 31.00 
54.3 59.5 55.5 55.8 56.1 55.3 54.5 54.2 
53.2 58.2 56.0 56.0 56.0 55.0 54.0 54.0 
60.8 66.1 58.0 58.0 58.0 57.0 57.0 56.0 
Assumptions for Tables 11 and 12: 
1. AI! production controls removed except those on tobacco. 
2. Price supports maintained at levels which would permit 
an orderly reduction of stocks over a 7- to 10·year 
period. 
3. United States population figure by 1965. 195.7 million. 
4. Per-capita disposable income by 1965, $2,120. 
5. Retail prices and prices paid by farmers not signifi-
cantly higher than present levels. 
6. Conservation reserve program of 30 million acres. 
7. Total acreage of cropland constant at the 1959 level. 
8. Yields increasing at less than the rate since 1940. 
9. Public Law 480 program continued at present levels. 
TABLE 12. Cash receipts - Projections based on Ellender assumptions, 1960-65, with comparisons lin millions of dollars). 
Commodity 
Aver-
age. 
1957-57 
1958 1959" 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Livestock: 
Cattle and calves ________ 5.500 7.403 7.350 7.240 7.020 6.620 6.475 6.390 
Hogs ___________________ 2.809 3.416 2.700 2.610 2.650 2.710 2.750 2.810 
Milk. whOlesale ________ 3.906 4.094 3.778 3.869 3.938 4.075 4.194 4.280 
Eggs ___________________ 1.723 1.770 1.838 1.586 1.567 1.574 1.583 1.619 
Broil&s _________________ ~8~5~6 ___ ~1~.0~0~2 ___ ~~~ __ =1~.0~0~8 ___ ~9~4~8~ ___ 9~4~1~ ___ ~9~59~ ___ ~9~4~0 ___ ~9~6~5 
Total livestock and 
products __________ =1:::6.::::5::::1::::8 ===1:::9=.3:::0=1====1::::8:,::.5==0::=:0===1:::8:::.::::30:::4====1=7:,::.8::::5=7==::::::::1:::7.=7::::28====1:::7:::.5::::4:::3====1=7:.5:;:5::::3====1:::7.:6=79 
Crops: Corn ___________________ 1.489 1.479 1.112 1.104 1.096 1.104 1.112 1.120 
Other feed grains ________ ~6~8=2 ___ ~9~5~6 ___ ~~~ __ --.:4::2~9 ___ --'4:.:3:.:8'--___ -"4 2:.:2~ ___ ..:.4=_19~ ___ ..:4=2.::.5 ___ ---'4~2C':7 
Total feed grains ____ 2.171 2.435 1.541 1.542 1.518 1.523 1.537 1.547 
Wheat _________________ 1.740 2.253 1.100 982 960 978 977 976 
Rice ___________________ 241 233 188 183 168 164 161 156 
Cotton _________________ 2.049 1.928 2.034 2.112 2.262 2.262 2.461 2.400 
Soybeans _______________ 883 1.117 872 904 928 952 984 1.008 
Peanuts ________________ ===1=6=0=======2=O=3==================9=4========~9~8========1~01========1::::0~5======~1~0~9======~1~12 
Tobacco. all __________ -=-'1.'.:1..:.1::.9 __ ~1:!..0~O::..:7~_---'::..::..::= __ ....:1:!..~00:..:7~ __ ..:.I!..:.0~3..:.2 ___ ;:,1.c:0.:.49=--__ ...:1:!..0::.:8:..:4:.... __ -=1"-'.1:.:2;.:;3 ___ ""1.c=1-=49 
~~~y;~ur~~ __ ====::=======;;.g~~~::::=:===~~;~~~=========g~=~=====~=~~~=====~~~4=3=====6::::2~=!=====~=~==~=====~=ii 
Total all crops ______ ~13~.~4~63~====1~4~.2~5~9~==~1~4~.2~0~0=====1~2~.~11~3~====1=2=.1~6=6====~1~2.=3~46~====1~2~.5~1~0~==~1~2~.8~5~O===~1~2.~9~11 
All coJ:~;~dlt;sm~_~ho'~~ ::-~~:~~i :g:~~~ 32.700 ~~:n~ :~:~g~ :5:ij~i ~~:~~~ i~:~~i i~:~~5 
n Average of first three quarters seasonally adjusted. 
SOl'rce: U. S. Dept. Agr. and Land qrant Colleges I;RM-1 Advjsory Committee .. ~arm price and Income projections. 1960-65 under 
conditions approximating free productIon and marketmg of agl'lcultural commoclltIes. 86th Cong., 2d sess. Doc. 77. Jan. 20. 1960. 
p. 23. 
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Programs adopted under this principle, therefore, 
do not represent a compromise between the benefits 
of new technology and the disturbance that it creates, 
but a full attainment of the benefits and a full com-
pensation for the disturbance. 
In concrete terms, an agricultural production-reduc-
tion program that would benefit many and harm none 
would pay a large enough compensation to secure 
voluntary coopcration from the farmers on those 
farms which should reduce production or go out of 
production. This would indicate that the farmers 
were fully compensated for the harm they would 
suffer - the change that they would have to make 
in their lives, and the temporarily or permanently 
lower level of incomes that they estimated they would 
have to accept as a result of the change. 
The same principle would apply to the non farmers 
- the local business people, the storekeepers, the 
bankers, etc. - in the community where agricultural 
production would be reduced enough to hurt their 
business. They as well as the farmers, would need to 
be compensated for the harm they suffered. 
The closer that the farms and farmers which moved 
out of production under this program were to being 
those that were least efficient in agricultural produc-
tion, the more nearly would the program be in line 
with thc long-run objectives of a growing and develop-
ing economy. 
Need Programs to Facilitate the Migration of 
Surplus Farmers Off Farms 
This program still would be only half a program, 
however, if it stopped there. It would 'have dealt 
with the oversupply of farm products, but it would 
not have dealt with the oversupply of farmers. If it 
stopped there, the remuneration to land and capital 
would rise, but the remuneration to labor - to the 
individual - would still remain low, as it did during 
the 1950 's, because the oversupply of farmers was not 
taken care of. 
Production control alone can solve only half of the 
problem. It can raise total United States farm in-
come. But it cannot deal effectively with the other 
part of the problem that results from the excessive 
supply of farmers and keeps income per farmer low. 
This calls for a reduction in the number of farmers. 
The farm population in the United States has 
declined from a peak of more than 32 million in 1933 
to about 21 million now. But the decline hasn't been 
rapid enough to keep up with the decline in demand 
for farmers. The problem no longer is, "How're you 
going to keep 'em down on the farm 1" but, "Hmv're 
you going to help them get offY" 
At the same time that farm incomes are low, urban 
incomes are increasing. Take engineering, for ex-
ample; the average engineering graduate at Iowa 
State University in 1959 had four job offers, at a 
starting salary of over $500 per month, based on a 
40·hour week. There are a large number of good 
urban jobs for people with training to handle them. 
But one big reason why farm boys do not take these 
jobs is that they do not have the training for them. 
Farm boys, as well as urban boys, can compete for 
these good jobs if they have the training. 
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They need to know about these jobs and the train-
ing required to qualify for them while they are young 
- before they have trained themselves as farmers 
and sunk a good share of their capital and lives into 
farming. An established farm family finds it most 
difficult to leave farming. Also the established farm 
operator cannot expect to get one of the higher-paying 
urban jobs when he does not have the training for it. 
So it appears that the best way to deal with this 
problem is to reach farm boys and girls while they are 
still in -high school. They need to be shown what per-
centage of them can expect to find places in farming 
and helped to compare farm and nonfarm incomes so 
that those who want nonfarm jobs can take the neces-
sary training and compete on more nearly equal terms 
with urban youth. 
It is estimated by Karl Shoemaker of the Federal 
Extension Service, USDA, that 85 percent of the 
youngsters on farms today will not be able to find 
good jobs as farmers as they grow Up.82 There just 
will not be enough farms with gross sales of $5,000 
or more to go around. This 85 percent will flood the 
farmer market and keep farmer incomes low just as 
it did in the 1950's. This will happen unless they can 
be informed of their prospects, provided with "voca-
tional-industrial" training and helped to find urban 
jobs after they are trained for them. 
This would call for a big change in our vocational 
agriculture training program - with agricultural 
training concentrated on the smaller number of farm 
boys who will actually become farmers. A greater 
number will need training for nonfarm jobs and help 
in obtaining them. 
Several states now have area vocational schools that 
provide this later type of training. Iowa as yet has 
none. Noncollegiate technical training of this sort was 
offered at Iowa State University in 1959 for the first 
time. Much more extensive development of this field 
will be needed to train and help farm youth who will 
not remain in farming obtain the relatively better· 
paid nonfarm jobs and occupations. The National 
Defense Education Act of 1958 may be one source of 
funds for this purpose. 
Until the excess farm population problem is solved, 
most of the benefits of technology and production-
control programs will continue to be capitalized into 
land values and show up more in thc form of higher 
prices for farms than in higher incomes per farmer. 
In view of this situation, it seems only reasonable that 
we should face the possibilities and encourage and 
help farm boys train themselves for the occupations 
they will follow, for off-farm jobs as well as fo1' farm 
jobs. 
Program Development 
To deal with area problems, what is needed is a 
group of separate but related income and cost pro-
grams, area by area. These programs need to deal 
separately with the particular net income or return-
to-family-Iabor problems in each area - and to deal 
with them, not by supporting prices or bolstering in-
32 Karl Shoemaker. Opportunities and limitations for employ-
ment of farm people within and outside of farming. U. S. Dept. 
Agr., Washington, D. C. AEP 89 (6·58) 
comc as such, leaving the underlying causes of low 
income unchanged, but by dealing with the underlying 
causes in each area. 
In areas where the underlying causes arc chiefly 
local, the programs need to deal chiefly with these 
local causes. In southern Iowa, for example, farm 
incomes are much lower than in northern Iowa, year 
after year. This is not just h8cause the soil is less 
fertile, and it is not just a commodity problem. It 
arises mostly because the type and organization of 
the farms are not properly adjusted to the soil, topo-
graphy and other characteristics of the area. In 
cases like these, more local or area research is needed 
to determine the nature of the maladjustment; why 
more farmers' sons, if not farmers themselves, do not 
move to more prosperous areas; the kind of solutions 
that are required to correct the maladjustments; and 
the programs that need to be developed by local or 
area groups in collaboration with state and fedcral 
agencies and put into effect to carry the solutiolls 
through. 
These programs could supplement the Rural Devel-
opment programs that were started in 1955 and are 
now operating in 200 of the 1,000 low-income countics 
in 30 states. 
These things require more research and program 
development, in many cases of a different character 
from what has been done before. }Iore research is 
needed all along thc line to help farmers 110t only 
to increase production and marketing efficiency, but 
also to adjust to the results of this efficiency so as to 
bendit rather than be harmed by it. Some research 
of this character is already being done to point the 
way; what is needed is to work out morc detailed map::; 
and directions and develop programs to deal with the 
problems revealed - different programs adapted to 
the different problems in the different areas. 
These programK could be developed with the help 
()f a series of separate conferences in each region. 
'l'hese conferences could include research men from 
t.he USDA and the state uniyersities in the region in 
t.Jleir role as research scientists; the organized farm 
<'>;l'OUpS in the region - Farm Bur·cau, Grange, Farm-
PI'S Vnion, etc.; the commodity groups involved, such 
liS the Milk Producers' Federation and the Great 
Plains 'Whcat Market Development Association, which 
includes stale nniversity research men in some of its 
l'onferences; farmers and lmsine~;s men in the region: 
>lnd consumers. T f the views of these conference mem-
hers were divergent, the conferences would be a good 
means for r'2s01ving them. 
'\'he state universities could well take til;: initiative 
;1" calling these conferences, as part of their agricul-
tural adjustment research and '2xtension activities. 
The conference::; could be expected 10 develop pro-
grams to be coordinated with programs from other 
regions; or, if more researeh is needed before such 
programs could be worked ont, the conferences could 
outline the needed research areas and al'l'angc for 
getting the research done. 
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